Polarized Voting and the Political Process:  The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence by Issacharoff, Samuel
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 90 Issue 7 
1992 
Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of 
Voting Rights Jurisprudence 
Samuel Issacharoff 
University of Texas School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Election Law Commons, Law and Race 
Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights 
Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833 (1992). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol90/iss7/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
POLARIZED VOTING AND THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
VOTING RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 
Samuel Issacharoff* 
INTRODUCTION ...•••••........••••.•...•••.•....••••.•..... 1833 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE RACIALLY POLARIZED 
VOTING INQUIRY ..•...••...•...••••••...•..•••..•••.•• 1838 
A. Minority Vote Dilution ............................. 1838 
B. The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act and 
the Emergence of the Racial Bloc Voting Inquiry .... 1845 
C. Thornburg v. Gingles.............................. 1850 
II. POLICING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS .•...•..•••••.....••••••.....•••.....••••....•• 1854 
A. The Right to Vote as a Group-Based Claim ......... 1856 
B. Judicial Oversight of the Political Process . . . . . . . . . . . 1859 
C. Vote Dilution Under a Conservative Judiciary ....... 1862 
D. Voting Rights and Process Corrections .............. 1865 
III. THE UNFORTUNATE REALITY OF RACIAL DIVISIONS •.• 1891 
A. Racial Identities, the Republican Consensus, and 
Individual Autonomy .............................. 1873 
B. Preference and Prejudice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1881 
1. The Arrow Impossibility Theorem ............... 1881 
2. Are the Discrete and Insular Disadvantaged? .... 1884 
CONCLUSION .......••....•..•••....•.••.....•••.......•••... 1890 
INTRODUCTION 
Why isn't voting rights litigation obsolete? A quarter century of 
federal policing of the electoral processes has markedly transformed 
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the political landscape. Gone are the poll taxes, 1 the literacy tests, 2 
and the other overt barriers to voter registration. Gone as well under 
the impact of one-person, one-vote is the artificial numerical inflation 
of the voting strength of one community at the expense of another.3 
Yet, despite these changes, voting rights claims continue to mount. 
For the past decade, changes in the substantive law governing voting 
rights claims have enhanced the efficacy of legal protections of the 
right to vote, clearing the way for greater judicial supervision of the 
electoral process. 
The statutory standard for challenging at-large or multimember 
elections under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act4 provides the clear-
est example of the increased protection of the franchise. In 1982, Con-
gress swiftly reacted to the Supreme Court's imposition of a restrictive 
intent-based test for voting rights claims in City of Mobile v. Bolden. s 
In place of the onerous requirement that plaintiffs prove that chal-
lenged electoral practices had been adopted to further direct discrimi-
natory purposes, 6 Congress recast the statutory voting rights doctrine 
to allow a broad-gauged inquiry into the "results"7 that challenged 
practices have on the capacity of minorities to participate fully in the 
political process. Then, in 1986, the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. 
Gingles 8 affirmed the constitutionality of the 1982 amendments and 
went on to ease greatly the evidentiary requirements for making out a 
claim of minority vote dilution.9 Instead of the multidimensional stat-
utory "totality of the circumstances" inquiry, the Court adopted a 
simplified test to determine whether white voters as a group had frus-
1. See Harperv. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down use of poll tax 
on federal constitutional grounds). 
2. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (affirming power of Congress under§ 4 
of the Voting Rights Act to suspend use ofliteracy tests); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 
(1966) (holding New York literacy requirement unlawful to the extent it is inconsistent with the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965). 
3. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (finding unequal apportionment of Tennessee state 
legislature to be justiciable constitutional claim); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (apply-
ing one-person, one-vote rule to state legislative apportionment). 
4. 42 u.s.c. § 1973 (1988). 
5. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion) (requiring proof of racially discriminatory motiva-
tion to strike down at-large or multimember election systems under either the Constitution or§ 2 
of the Voting Rights Act). 
6. 446 U.S. at 62-68. 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982). 
8. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
9. The concept of "vote dilution" as applied to minority citizens began with the Supreme 
Court's recognition in Allen v. State Board of Elections that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by 
a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot." 393 U.S. 
544, 569 (1969). In the context of at-large or multimember elections, minority voters could face 
an electoral system that would "nullify their ability to elect the candidate of their choice just as 
would prohibiting some of them from voting." 393 U.S. at 569. 
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trated the electoral aspirations of a cohesive set of minority voters and, 
if so, whether an alteration of electoral practices could relieve the dim-
inution of minority electoral opportunity.10 
The invigoration of statutory protections under section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act11 accompanies the Supreme Court's generally ex-
pansive view of the extraordinary procedural provisions of section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act. Section 5 requires certain jurisdictions, largely 
in the South, to submit for preclearance all proposed electoral or vot-
ing changes to the Department of Justice or a three-judge court in the 
District of Columbia.12 Despite the increased prominence of federalist 
concerns in recent Supreme Court opinions, 13 two of the Court's most 
10. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51. The Court's inquiry, designed in the context of 
a challenge to the impact of multimember election districts on minority electoral prospects, fo-
cused on three prerequisites to a successful voting rights claim. First, the minority group had to 
show that it could command a majority in a redrawn single-member district. Second, the minor-
ity community had to show that it was politically cohesive in its electoral preferences. Third, 
plaintiffs needed to demonstrate that their electoral choices were usually defeated as a result of 
the uniform voting patterns of the white majority community. 478 U.S. at 50-51; see infra notes 
93-97 and accompanying text. 
11. With its decisions last term in Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991), and Houston 
Lawyers' Assn. v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991), the Court extended the reach of§ 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act to the one bastion of governmental power that had remained largely 
unaffected by the integrationist transformation of American politics: the elected state judiciaries. 
In holding for the first time that elected judges are fully within the reach of the Act, the Court 
reaffirmed that the Voting Rights Act "should be interpreted in a manner that provides 'the 
broadest possible scope' in combatting racial discrimination." Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. at 
2368 (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969)). According to the Court, 
no elected institution stands immune from the antidiscrimination commands of the Voting 
Rights Act, not even one as removed from the customary meaning of the statutory term "repre-
sentative" as the state judiciaries. Thus, the Court held, "[t]he reasons why Louisiana has cho-
sen [to elect its judges rather than appoint them] are precisely the reasons why it is appropriate 
for ..• the Voting Rights Act to continue to apply to its judicial elections." 111 S. Ct. at 2367. 
For evidence of the continuing inability of minorities to penetrate state judiciaries, see, for 
example, League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 656 
n.7 (5th Cir. 1990) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (preclearance of at-large judicial elections denied in 
Georgia, partially because of "a consistent lack of minority electoral success" in such elections); 
914 F.2d at 665 n.25 ("[M]inorities in the challenged Texas districts are seldom ever - indeed, 
are only with great rarity - able to elect minority candidates to any of the at-large district court 
judge positions available .••• "), revd. sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Assn. v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. 
Ct. 2376 (1991); Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1058 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that no black 
person had ever been elected to the Louisiana Supreme Court), cert. denied sub nom. Roemer v. 
Chisom, 488 U.S. 955 (1988); Ewing v. Monroe County, Miss., 740 F. Supp. 417, 424 (N.D. 
Miss. 1990) (finding that no black had ever been elected to county judgeship in county with large 
black population); Mallory v. Eyrich, 707 F. Supp. 947, 954 (S.D. Ohio 1989) ("[D]uring the 
twenty-year period examined by the parties, no blacks have been elected to either the Hamilton 
County Municipal Court or the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court."). But see Williams v. 
State Bd. of Elections, 718 F. Supp. 1324, 1328-29 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (granting defendants' motion 
for summary judgment where several minority candidates had won judicial elections). See gener-
ally FUND FOR THE MODERN COURTS, INC., THE SUCCESS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN 
ACHIEVING JUDICIAL OFFICE: THE SELECTION PROCESS 13 (1985) (reporting that as of 1985, 
only 3.8% of the state judges in the United States were black and 1.2% were Hispanic). 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). See generally Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 
566-70 (1969) (defining broad scope of preclearance requirement). 
13. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2401 (1991) ("[T]he States retain substan-
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recent cases under section 5 have dramatically enhanced federal power 
to regulate electoral processes.14 In City of Pleasant Grove v. United 
States 15 and Clark v. Roemer, 16 the Court backed a broad interpreta-
tion of section S's preclearance requirement, first to reach ill-moti-
vated municipal annexation decisions even in the absence of any 
proved discriminatory impact17 and then, unanimously, to reinvigo-
rate the injunctive reach of the Act. 18 
All of these substantive developments raise common questions: 
What is it that lends to voting rights claims a resilience, through the 
Reagan era and its Supreme Court, that is unmatched in any other 
area of civil rights law? And why the perceived need to expand the 
reach of the Act in light of the dramatic democratization of the polit-
ical processes since the Court first set foot in the "political thicket" in 
the 1960s? 
This article will address these issues by focusing on the transforma-
tion of voting rights litigation in the past decade. Accompanying the 
expansion of statutory remedies under the Act in the 1980s was a fun-
damental change in voting rights jurisprudence. In place of a mean-
dering, inconclusive attempt to police the entirety of the political 
process through the mediating lens of the right to the franchise, the 
new jurisprudence focused court attention on the actual patterns of 
group voting in America. This inquiry, termed the test of racial bloc 
voting, gave voting rights claims a pluralistic perspective and provided 
both a powerful appeal to a conservative judiciary and a reason for 
probing beyond the issue of simple access to the polling booth. 
The focus on racially polarized voting patterns forced the judiciary 
to confront the actual operation of challenged electoral systems in or-
der to identify precisely the discriminatory mechanisms that frustrated 
minority political aspirations. By redirecting focus to the bloc voting 
tial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not 
readily interfere."). 
14. But see Presley v. Etowah County Commn., 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992) (refusing to apply § 5 
to county commissioners' internal reallocation of authority in a manner that curtailed the powers 
of newly elected black commissioners). See infra note 29. 
15. 479 U.S. 462 (1987). 
16. 111 s. Ct. 2096 (1991). 
17. In Pleasant Grove, the Court upheld the denial of preclearance to an all-white municipal-
ity for the annexation of an area inhabited by white families after the city had refused to annex an 
adjacent black neighborhood. Despite the fact that no minorities lived in Pleasant Grove, so 
there would be no discernible impact on preexisting minority political power, the Court nonethe-
less held that the indicia of discriminatory animus were sufficient to foreclose the proposed an-
nexation. 479 U.S. at 471-72. 
18. Clark v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2096 (1991) (holding that district courts should enjoin elec-
tions if the pertinent voting statutes have not been precleared under§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 
instead of allowing unprecleared electoral practices to be used on an interim basis). 
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practices of majority white communities and the resulting exclusion of 
minority-supported candidates from public office, the new voting 
rights jurisprudence identified two fundamental distortions in the elec-
toral arena. First, electoral systems that fail to curb the deleterious 
consequences of racial bloc voting reward a racially defined majority 
faction with disproportionate political power and, consequently, with 
disproportionate access to the goods and services distributed through 
the legislative process. Second, the emergence of a racially defined 
majority faction compounds the potential for continued social and 
economic subordination of historically disadvantaged minorities. 
The combination of a new voting rights doctrine focusing on actual 
electoral practices with the prevalence of such racially identifiable vot-
ing patterns in elections across the country made the new voting rights 
law a powerful weapon in the judicial transformation of local govern-
ments. Strangely, however, the new voting rights jurisprudence has 
not drawn significant attention from the legal academy. For the past 
quarter century, the commands of individual- and group-based equal-
ity in the political arena have significantly transformed the political 
institutions of this country.19 Yet the jurisprudential transformation 
of the positive law remains surprisingly unexplored. 
This article attempts to provide an analytic framework for the 
evolved voting rights law as it confronts the persistent effects of racial 
factionalism in the electoral arena. Insight into the corrosiveness of 
racially polarized voting and its frustration of minority electoral op-
portunity has organized and guided the new voting rights jurispru-
dence. This article will argue that the combination of process 
distortions from majority domination of electoral outcomes and sub-
stantive deprivation from minority exclusion defines this area of law 
and protects it against challenge from currently fashionable academic 
currents. The central insights gathered from the focus on polarized 
voting, I will argue, insulate voting rights law from the neoconserva-
tive charge that the Act is but a poorly veiled form of affirmative ac-
tion and from the public-choice claim that solicitude for minority 
actors in the political marketplace is fundamentally misconceived. 
19. Professor Peter Schuck has described the transformation as follows: "Few contemporary 
legal developments are as striking, as unexpected, and as potentially far-reaching as the federal 
courts' redesign of the fundamental structures, institutions and incentives that frame and fuel 
political struggle at all levels of government. The c:;ourts have become principal regulators of 
politics." Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regu-
lation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1325 (1987) (footnote omitted). 
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE RACIALLY POLARIZED 
VOTING INQUIRY 
A. Minority Vote Dilution 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 undertook to dismantle a simple 
yet overwhelming problem: the physical obstacles to blacks' getting to 
the ballot box and casting their votes.20 The Act's substantive provi-
sions were aimed primarily at restrictions on voter registration and on 
the actual casting of ballots - the inheritances of the Black Codes of 
the southern states - which in ways both subtle and overt had kept 
black citizens from exercising the franchise.21 Like the other statutory 
centerpiece of the civil rights era, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the Voting Rights Act set its sights on the most visible barriers 
to black legal equality. These barriers were defined primarily as di-
rect, formal discriminatory practices intended to exclude black partici-
pation in the central political and economic institutions of American 
life. Section 2 of the Act prohibited the use of any electoral practice or 
procedure which infringed the right to vote on the basis of race or 
color,22 while section 4 ordered the suspension of literacy tests and 
similar devices in states where less than half the population was regis-
tered to vote or did vote.23 The forces behind the Voting Rights Act 
assumed that curbing black disenfranchisement would lead inevitably 
to the right to full political equality, including the election of the rep-
resentatives of choice of the black community.24 
Achieving black political equality proved a more vexing problem 
than anticipated. The "first generation" of voting rights challenges 
forced the removal of the open barriers to black registration25 and the 
20. The first federal voting rights statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1957, authorized the U.S. 
Attorney General to enjoin the intimidation of voters in federal elections. Pub. L. No. 85-315, 
§ 131, 71 Stat. 634, 637 (1957) (superseded by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1975(c) (West Supp. 1992)). 
21. See DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA 19 (1978) (reporting 43.1% black voter 
registration rates in 11 southern states in 1964, but only 33.9% registration in the five Deep 
South states); THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT TEN YEARS AFTER 43 (1975) (estimating black voter 
registration rates in 1965 at 29.3% for five Deep South states plus North Carolina and South 
Carolina); Dianne M. Pinderhughes, Legal Strategies for Voting Rights: Political Science and the 
Law, 28 How. L.J. 515, 525 (1985) (reporting same 1965 figure of only 29% of southern voting· 
age blacks registered to vote). 
22. 42 u.s.c. § 1973 (1988). 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988); see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
24. See 111 CONG. REc. H5059 (1965) (belief of President Johnson that the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 would effectively give all citizens the right to choose their own leaders). 
25. The Voting Rights Act, together with the Freedom Rides and the use of Federal Regis-
trars, had an immediate effect on black voter registration rates. A rapid increase in black voter 
registration across the South tripled the number of registered black voters. See Bobby M. Ru-
barts, Comment, The Crown Jewel of American Liberty: The Right to Vote, What Does it Mean 
Under the Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 1015, 1020 (1985). 
Despite the improvements, barriers to voter registration persist in the form of time and place 
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casting of ballots. The successes of this first generation of legal chal-
lenge revealed a second set of obstacles that undermined the effective-
ness of newly registered black citizens' emerging freedom to exercise 
the franchise. As blacks began to register and vote in increasing num-
bers, their electoral expectations were frustrated by political institu-
tions that were well-insulated from challenge. The pattern was 
strikingly similar to the far better-known Supreme Court confronta-
tion with continued exclusion of minorities from job opportunities 
even after formal discriminatory barriers were removed - what the 
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 26 called the "built-in headwinds" 
impeding minority advancement.27 These second-tier problems in em-
ployment gave rise to the "disparate impact" inquiry into structural 
employment requirements, such as advanced educational degrees or 
success on standardized examinations, that effectively barred minority 
economic opportunity. In the voting rights case law, an equivalent 
inquiry emerged: the courts began to condemn "minority vote dilu-
tion" caused by the structural diminution of electoral opportunities, 
even where minorities could relatively freely register and vote. 
The principal target of this "second-generation" challenge28 to 
structural obstacles to minority political advancement was the use of 
at-large or multimember electoral districts. The widespread use of 
multimember electoral systems dates from the tum of the century, 
when a.ti unusual alliance of northern Progressives and southern Re-
deemers endeavored to curtail the ability of community-based political 
machines, depicted pejoratively as ward heelers, to deliver the spoils of 
power to their local political bases. 29 By eliminating the local bases of 
voting power of, respectively, urban working-class ethnics and freed 
restrictions on voter registration. See Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 
F. Supp. 1245, 1255 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (finding 25% gap between black and white registration 
rates in Mississippi), affd., 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991); Allan J. Lichtman & Samuel Is-
sacharoff, Black/White Voter Registration Disparities in Mississippi: Legal and Methodological 
Issues in Challenging Bureau of Census Data, 7 J.L. & POL. 525 (1991) (reporting methodology 
used to determine continuing impact of restrictive voter registration laws). 
26. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
27. 401 U.S. at 432. 
28. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of 
Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1077, 1093 (1991) (tracing the shift from first-genera-
tion challenges to overt black disenfranchisement to second-generation concerns with meaningful 
political opportunity for enfranchised minorities). 
29. A rich fact scenario for the real operation of locally based political machines in Etowah 
and Russell Counties, Alabama, recently confronted the Supreme Court. Presley v. Etowah 
County Commn., 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992). Prior to a successful challenge under§ 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, Etowah County elected all of its commissioners at large, resulting in an all-white 
county commission. The county allowed each commissioner to let road contracts independently, 
a tremendous source of power and patronage in rural southern communities. When the county 
was forced to adopt a single-member district plan under court order, four incumbent commis-
sioners voted to give themselves joint, exclusive authority over roads and to relegate two newly 
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slaves, 30 the tum-of-the-century reformers hoped to centralize political 
power through the use of at-large and multimember election devices. 
These election schemes allow for serial voting that, in the context of a 
majority voting bloc, will reward a cohesive majority with superordi-
nate representation: 
The "winner-take-all" character of the typical election scheme creates 
the possibility that a specific majority will elect all the representatives 
from a multimember district whereas the outvoted minority might have 
been able to elect some representatives if the multimember district had 
been broken down into several single member districts. 31 
The Court first confronted the group-based nature of vote dilution 
claims in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 32 a challenge to the impact of Indiana's 
multimember state legislative districts on black inner-city residents of 
Indianapolis. Although Whitcomb rejected plaintiffs' plea for the cre-
ation of single-member districts, which would have allowed for en-
hanced black representation,33 the Court wavered uneasily between 
individual- and group-based inquiries in addressing the vote dilution 
claim. The Court acknowledged that the relevant inquiry was whether 
the affected black plaintiffs as a group had less opportunity than other 
similarly situated voters "to participate in the political process and to 
elect legislators of their choice."34 The Court's characterization of the 
elected commissioners (one of whom was black) to overseeing courthouse maintenance and engi-
neering. 
Justice Kennedy, writing for a six-justice majority, held that the commissioners' resolution 
affected "only the allocation of power among governmental officials"; it was not subject to the 
Act's preclearance requirements under § 5 because the resolution lacked any "direct relation to 
voting itself." 112 S. Ct. at 832. 
30. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, AMERICAN PoLmCAL HISTORY AS SOCIAL ANALYSIS 215-16 
(1980) (The turn to at-large elections was "an attempt by upper-class, advanced professional, and 
large-business groups to take formal political power from the previously dominant lower- and 
middle-class elements so that they might advance their own conceptions of desirable public pol-
icy."); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN PoLmCS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION 
AND THE EsrABLISHMENT OF THE ONE· PARTY SOUTH 257-61 (1974); JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE 
CoRPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE: 1900-1918, at 109-10 (1968) ("[T)he heart of the 
[at-large commission] plan, that of electing only a few men on a citywide vote, made election of 
minority or labor candidates more difficult •... "); J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the 
First Reconstruction: Lessons/or the Second, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 27, 30-37 (Chandler 
Davidson ed., 1984). 
31. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 13-8, at 750 (1st ed. 1978). 
32. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
33. The Court stated: 
We see nothing in the findings of the District Court indicating recurring poor performance 
by Marion County's delegation with respect to Center Township ghetto, nothing to show 
what the ghetto's interests were in particular legislative situations and nothing to indicate 
that the outcome would have been any different if the 23 assemblymen had been chosen 
from single-member districts. 
403 U.S. at 155. 
34. 403 U.S. at 149. This same inquiry is expressed in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48 
(1986), as whether a challenged at-large electoral scheme "operates to minimize or cancel out 
[minority citizens'] ability to elect their preferred candidates." 
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inquiry, however, was immediately coupled with a highly individual-
oriented factual conclusion: 
We have discovered nothing in the record or in the court's findings indi-
cating that poor Negroes were not allowed to register or vote, to choose 
the political party they desired to support, to participate in its affairs or 
to be equally represented on those occasions when legislative candidates 
were chosen. 35 
Consequently, 
The mere fact that one interest group or another concerned with the 
outcome of Marion County elections has found itself outvoted and with-
out legislative seats of its own provides no basis for invoking constitu-
tional remedies where, as here, there is no indication that this segment of 
the population is being denied access to the political system. 36 
The voting rights case law found its analog to Griggs in White v. 
Regester, 37 the Supreme Court's 1973 opinion on the constitutional-
ity38 of multimember districts for election to the Texas state legisla-
ture. In White, the Court for the first time struck down the use of 
multimember electoral districts because of its finding, under a new 
"totality of the circumstances" test, 39 that such districts "enhanced 
the opportunity for racial discrimination. "40 In the aftermath of 
White, multimember districts - and particularly at-large elections -
became the target of voting rights plaintiffs. 
35. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149. 
36. 403 U.S. at 154-55. 
37. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
38. Because of the presence of state action in the creation and maintenance of all electoral 
systems, the early voting rights case law did not develop any distinction between statutory claims 
and claims brought under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. The Voting Rights Act was 
originally intended to enforce the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment. See Pub. L. No. 89-
110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). According to the Court, "it is apparent that the language of§ 2 [of the 
Act] no more than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment, and the sparse legislative 
history of § 2 makes clear that it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the 
Fifteenth Amendment itself." City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980) (plurality 
opinion). Only after the imposition of an intent standard for constitutional voting rights claims 
in City of Mobile and Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), did passage of the 1982 amendments 
to the Act draw a line of demarcation. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text. 
39. White followed by two years the Supreme Court's ruling in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 
U.S. 124 (1971), that the use of at-large legislative elections in Marion County, Indiana (site of 
Indianapolis) was not unconstitutional. In Whitcomb, the Court framed the inquiry as requiring 
proof that "ghetto residents had less opportunity than did other Marion County residents to 
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice." 403 U.S. at 149. 
Absent showings that blacks suffered obstacles in either registration or casting ballots or that 
slating processes precluded blacks' participation in the county's political parties, the Court de-
clined to strike down the multimember electoral system on the basis of election outcomes alone: 
[T]he failure of the ghetto to have legislative seats in proportion to its population emerges 
more as a function of losing elections than of built-in bias against poor Negroes. The voting 
power of ghetto residents may have been "cancelled out" as the District Court held, but this 
seems a mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls. 
403 U.S. at 153. 
40. 412 U.S. at 766. 
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The shift in focus to multimember and at-large election systems 
created a critical juncture in the transformation of voting rights juris-
prudence. Unlike the first generation of voting rights challenges, 
which targeted the formal exclusion of blacks from the franchise and 
where the precise harms were easy to identify, no such easy targets 
anchored the second generation of voting rights law in cases like 
White. 41 The Court's ruling in White rested on a compendium of fac-
tors that included the history of de jure discrimination against black 
voters in Texas,42 the depressed socioeconomic status of Mexican-
Americans,43 the existence of closed-door meetings by the Anglo polit-
ical establishment to slate candidates for office, 44 depressed voter par-
ticipation and registration levels of minorities, 45 and the paucity of 
minorities in elective office.46 
In protecting the claims of group exclusion from the rewards of 
political participation in White, the Court decisively shifted away from 
the primary focus on individual access to the polling place that charac-
terized the Act's initial concem.47 White struck down multimember 
election practices because of an effective abridgment of a newly recog-
nized group-based right, 48 defined as the right of racial and ethnic mi-
norities meaningfully to participate in the political process, 49 which in 
tum the Court defined specifically to include the election of represent-
41. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), antici-
pated the conceptual difficulty in addressing group disadvantaging legislation. Justice Harlan 
distinguished statutes that purposefully made it more difficult or impossible for individual minor-
ities to participate from those that allowed the majority community to consistently frustrate the 
political aspirations of the minority community. 393 U.S. at 393-94 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
42. White, 412 U.S. at 766. 
43. 412 U.S. at 768. 
44. 412 U.S. at 766-67. 
45. 412 U.S. at 768. 
46. 412 U.S. at 768-69. 
47. See Guinier, supra note 28, at 1093; Joan F. Hartman, Racial Vote Dilution and Separa-
tion of Powers: An Exploration of the Conflict Between the Judicial "Intent" and the Legislative 
"Results" Standards, 50 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 689, 690 (1982) (early voting rights case law 
aimed at equalizing the weight of each citizen's vote); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: 
The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
R.Ev. 173, 184 (1989) ("Congress' optimism that ensuring the right to register and cast a ballot 
would provide black citizens with effective political power soon proved ill-founded. • • • The 
courts and the executive branch were soon called upon to address the question of racial vote 
dilution."). 
The focus on individual rights was also a hallmark of the Court's initial abandonment of the 
political question doctrine. Thus, in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court struck 
down the malapportioned state legislative districts of Alabama because such malapportionment 
violated each voter's essential right "to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice," which 
could be "denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote." 377 U.S. at 555. 
48. White, 412 U.S. at 766. 
49. 412 U.S. at 767. 
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atives of choice. so The result was a shift from the focus on the treat-
ment of individuals in the electoral marketplace, the voting rights 
equivalent to disparate treatment claims under Title VII, to a new con-
cern with the rights of group-based representation. In White v. 
Regester, therefore, the Court found the electoral parallel to the dispa-
rate impact cause of action introduced by Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
The group-based focus of White v. Regester also set the stage for 
reevaluating judicial oversight of the decennial state legislative and 
congressional redistricting under the constitutional commands of one-
person, one-vote. If minorities are distributed among potential single-
member legislative or congressional districts in a more or less even 
manner, then, despite the single-member characteristic of each indi-
vidual office, a districting system may be drawn to subordinate minori-
ties mathematically within each of the electoral districts and deny 
minorities any opportunity for representation. The same processes of 
majority overrepresentation could be reproduced across even single-
member districts in a large jurisdiction if the districting process re-
sulted in a proportion of minorities in any given district lacking a criti-
cal mass for electoral influence. 
The Court in White, however, failed to articulate the basis for its 
invalidation of the Texas legislative electoral system. The Court noted 
de jure discrimination against blacks, but not against Hispanics. Can-
didate slating, one of the practices singled out for condemnation, ad-
versely affected blacks in Dallas County, but no mention was made of 
the existence (or nonexistence) of slating organizations in Bexar 
County, the site of the Mexican-American challenge.s1 Hispanics 
were found to suffer from low levels of voter registration, in part be-
cause of cultural and linguistic barriers, but no comparable finding 
was made concerning blacks. sz The Court's opaque reasoning "gave 
no hint of the priority it attached to any of these facts; instead, it ap-
proved the district court's conclusion of unconstitutionality based on 
the 'totality of the circumstances.' "S3 Under the press of repeated 
challenges to the use of at-large elections in the Deep South, the Fifth 
Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen s4 sought to salvage some order from 
50. 412 U.S. at 769. 
51. 412 U.S. at 766-69. 
52. 412 U.S. at 766-69. 
53. James Blacksher & Larry Menefee, At-Large Elections and One Person, One Vote: The 
Search for the Meaning of Racial Vote Dilution, in MINORITY VoTE DILUTION, supra note 30, at 
203, 216 (quoting White, 412 U.S. at 769). 
54. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), affd. sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. 
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). 
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White. 55 Despite uncertainty over the precise application of a "totality 
of the circumstances" analysis to any particular case, the reconstituted 
White/Zimmer evidentiary standard did provide a litigation arsenal 
for claims of minority vote dilution that held sway until the Supreme 
Court unceremoniously rejected it in 1980 in City of Mobile v. 
Bolden. 56 
Two critical points emerge from the relatively short lifespan of the 
White/Zimmer standard for vote dilution claims. The first is the ab-
sence of an overriding conception of the precise constitutional harm 
the courts were seeking to remedy. What was meant by "minority 
vote dilution"? Clearly the courts were concerned with the paucity of 
minority elected officials. But this concern was not reflected in any 
doctrinal requirement that there be a complete frustration of minority 
electoral aspirations as an indispensable component of a vote dilution 
claim under White/Zimmer. While many of the cases addressed a 
pattern of complete exclusion of blacks from elected office since the 
end of Reconstruction, some, including White itself, evidenced limited 
minority electoral success. Similarly, while the White/Zimmer stan-
dard developed in the context of multimember or at-large elections, 
the use of such election systems was not" itself evidence of vote dilu-
tion; the Supreme Court cautioned that at-large elections were not per 
se unconstitutional.57 Thus, while the vote dilution theory emerged 
out of the frustration of minority electoral prospects in multimember 
election systems, White was unable to specify which functional compo-
nents of such elections were objectionable - a critical failure in a case 
marking such an important doctrinal breakthrough. On this score, 
Zimmer could only counsel that "[c]learly, it is not enough to prove a 
mere disparity between the number of minority residents and the 
number of minority representatives."58 
Second, neither White nor Zimmer could identify the operational 
mechanism for the unconstitutional dilution of minority voting 
strength. Neither opinion examined actual voting patterns to deter-
55. The Fifth Circuit recast White as follows: 
[W]here a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of slating candidates, the 
unresponsiveness oflegislators to their particularized interests, a tenuous state policy under-
lying the preference for multi-member or at-large districting, or that the existence of past · 
discrimination in general precludes the effective participation in the election system, a strong 
case is made. Such proof is enhanced by a showing of the existence of large districts, major-
ity vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions and the lack of provision for at-
large candidates running from particular geographical subdistricts. The fact of dilution is 
established upon proof of the existence of an aggregate of these factors. 
485 F.2d at 1305 (footnotes omitted). • 
56. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
57. See Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1965). 
58. 485 F.2d at 1305. 
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mine either minority preferences or whether the majority community 
was engaging in any impermissible electoral behavior. The White/ 
Zimmer test ended up looking both backward from the electoral pro-
cess, to examine the historical circumstances leading to its establish-
ment, and forward to determine the outcomes of policy decisions by 
legislative bodies elected under such electoral arrangements. But this 
test conspicuously failed to provide an analytic tool for examining 
electoral behavior itself. The White/Zimmer "totality of the circum-
stances" test was static; its aim was to uncover the dynamic workings 
of electoral systems, but it had no way to measure the operational fea-
tures of challenged electoral practices. Instead, the White/Zimmer 
case law searched for a prosaic formula, such as "one person, one 
vote,"59 that could provide a ready definition oflack of equal political 
participation. Even on that score, the best that White/Zimmer could 
muster was the need to examine the "totality of the circumstances," an 
inquiry as empty as the resigned "I know it when I see it" approach to 
obscenity under the First Amendment. 60 
B. The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act and the 
Emergence of the Racial Bloc Voting Inquiry 
The Supreme Court's 1980 decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden 61 
decisively repudiated the White/Zimmer view of minority vote dilu-
tion. The Court recast voting rights claims in the mold of Washington 
v. Davis, 62 a watershed decision under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and required proof of invidious purpose 
in the maintenance and adoption of at-large electoral systems. Absent 
direct evidence of invidious purpose, no multimember electoral sys-
59. With the emergence of the one-person, one-vote standard for apportionment cases in 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court created a relatively manageable norm against 
which claims of numerical malapportionment could be measured. For criticisms of the Court's 
fashioning of the one-person, one-vote standard, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICI-
ARY 8 (1977) ("[T)he 'one man, one vote' cases represent an awesome exercise of power, a[] 180-
degree revision, taking from the States a power that unmistakably was left to them."); ALEXAN-
DER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 169 n.* (1970) ("[T]he 
Warren Court chose to assume ..• that legislative policy is really made in elections, in which all 
groups have an equal chance, guaranteed by the one-man, one-vote rule, to coalesce with other 
ones in the formation of governing majorities. But this assumption is hardly realistic."); Robert 
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I, 18 (1971) ("The 
principle of one man, one vote was not neutrally derived: it runs counter to the text of the 
fourteenth amendment, the history surrounding its adoption and ratification and the political 
practice of Americans from colonial times up to the day the Court invented the new formula."); 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 85 (1990) (reiterating this view). 
60. This, of course, is Justice Stewart's famous phrase, born of the Supreme Court's frustra-
tion in assigning any precise meaning to the concept of unprotected pornography. See Jacobellis 
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
61. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
62. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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terns could be challenged under either the Constitution63 or the Voting 
Rights Act. 64 Each of the White/Zimmer evidentiary factors was 
deemed to be of limited utility in establishing the ultimate issue of 
direct invidious motive. 65 Although the Supreme Court backed off 
from the most restrictive interpretation of the evidentiary weight of 
the White/Zimmer factors two years later in Rogers v. Lodge, 66 the 
Court's constricting interpretation of vote dilution in Bolden forced a 
reexamination of the accumulated grab bag of evidentiary factors in-
herited from the earliest challenges to at-large or multimember 
elections. 
Bolden itself turned out to be a short-lived interruption in the de-
velopment of voting rights jurisprudence. As has been well chroni-
cled, Congress in 1982 amended the Voting Rights Act expressly to 
repudiate Bolden and to outlaw electoral practices that "result in" the 
denial of equal political opportunity to minority groups. 67 Less fully 
63. The actual requirement of proving invidious intent received the support of only a plural· 
ity of the Court in Bolden. 446 U.S. at 58 (opinion of Justice Powell for four members of the 
Court). Justice Blackmun concurred in the result, 446 U.S. at 80, and Justice Stevens concurred 
in the judgment, 446 U.S. at 83. 
64. Justice Stewart arrived at this statutory rule by concluding that § 2 of the Act did noth· 
ing more than elaborate on the Fifteenth Amendment, 446 U.S. at 60-61, and by then concluding 
that the Fifteenth Amendment, like the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
could only prohibit purposeful discrimination, 446 U.S. at 61-66. 
65. The fact that minority candidates have been defeated "alone does not work a constitu-
tional deprivation." 446 U.S. at 73 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.). Discrimination against 
minority citizens in the provision of municipal services "is relevant only as the most tenuous artd 
circumstantial evidence of the constitutional invalidity of the electoral system under which they 
attained their offices." 446 U.S. at 74. "[P]ast discrimination cannot, in the manner of original 
sin, condemn governmental action that is not itself unlawful." 446 U.S. at 74. Finally, the 
"mechanics of the at-large electoral system" are "far from proof that the at-large electoral 
scheme represents purposeful discrimination against Negro voters." 446 U.S. at 74. 
66. 458 U.S. 613 (1982). In Rogers, the Court directly held that claims of diminution of 
minority voting power had to satisfy an intent-based standard of liability. However, the Court 
allowed the White/Zimmer test to stand as a proxy for invidious intent, a position diametrically 
opposite to the Court's ruling in Bolden. See Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The 
Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328, 348-49 & n.120 (1982) (comparing 
Bolden and Rogers standards of proof of liability). 
67. See Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982)); S. REP. No. 
417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 179 (reporting express legisla-
tive purpose of overruling Bolden for statutory voting rights claims). See generally MICHAEL 
PERTSCHUK, GIANT KILLERS 151-52 (1986) (rejection of intent-based standard was part of lob· 
byists' agenda for the 1982 amendments); Kathryn Abrams, ''Raising Politics Up'~· Minority 
Political Participation and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 458·60 
(1988); James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Pur-
pose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REV. 633, 649-58 (1983); 
Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A 
Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1347, 1399-400 (1983); Armand Derfner, Vote 
Dilution and the Voting Rights Act of 1982, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 30, at 145, 
159-61; Roy A. McKenzie & Ronald A. Krauss, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: An Analysis 
of the 1982 Amendment, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 155, 163-71 (1984); Frank R. Parker, The 
''Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. 
REV. 715, 747-50 (1983). 
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explored is the flip side of the repudiation of Bolden - that is, what 
standard Congress was affirmatively enacting. Despite repeated 
claims in the legislative history that the 1982 amendments simply re-
stored the preexisting White/Zimmer measure of vote dilution, 68 the 
story is more complicated. 
As developed above, one of the striking features of the White/Zim-
mer test was its curious silence about how voting actually transpired. 
Without an account of how the process of diluting voting strength op-
erated, the White/Zimmer test had left courts describing both the con-
text in which minority vote dilution was likely to occur (e.g., against a 
backdrop of historic discrimination and depressed socioeconomic sta-
tus of minorities) and the likely outcome of diminished minority polit-
ical influence (e.g., nonresponsiveness by governmental institutions), 
but without a core definition of what the dilutive mechanism was. By 
contrast, for social scientists, minority vote dilution was undefinable 
without reference to the actual workings of the election system: 
"[D]ilution is a process whereby election laws or practices, either sin-
gly or in concert, combine with systematic bloc voting among an iden-
tifiable group to diminish the voting strength of at least one other 
group."69 
While central to the social science definition of vote dilution, the 
concept of bloc voting patterns had appeared in passing in only two 
Supreme Court voting rights cases prior to Bolden, both arising under 
the preclearance requirements of section 5 of the Act. 70 In Beer v. 
United States, 71 the Supreme Court reviewed a district court holding 
that the proposed redistricting of the New Orleans city council was 
statutorily infirm because of the combination of the proposed district-
ing lines and the history of polarized voting patterns in New Orleans. 
Because the case forced the Court to confront the effect that alterna-
tive districting plans would have on electoral outcomes, the racial bloc 
voting inquiry was squarely joined. While the majority reversed the 
district court on the narrow ground that section 5 covered only retro-
gressive changes in election practices, both Justices Marshall and 
White embraced the polarized voting analysis in dissents. According 
to Justice White, the author of White v. Regester, 
Bloc racial voting is an unfortunate phenomenon, but we are repeat-
68. A typical example is the floor statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner: "Let there be no 
question then. We are writing into law our understanding of the test in White against Regester." 
128 CONG. REC. 14,934 (1982). 
69. Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 
30, at 1, 4. 
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). 
71. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
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edly faced with the findings of knowledgeable district courts that it is a 
fact of life .... As I see it, Congress has the power to minimize the effects 
of racial voting, particularly where it occurs in the context of other elec-
toral rules operating to muffie the political potential of the minority.72 
The following year the Court again confronted a claim that ra-
cially polarized voting, combined with unfavorably drawn district 
lines, diminished group electoral prospects. In United Jewish Organi-
zations v. Carey, 13 the Court acknowledged a claim by Hasidic Jews 
that the creation of a heavily black district in which they were the 
minority, combined with racial bloc voting, defeated their opportunity 
to elect candidates of their choice. The Court nonetheless refused to 
allow a showing of polarized voting patterns itself to prove the statu-
tory or constitutional infirmity of an electoral system. 74 The Court 
found no support for the "proposition that the candidates who are 
found racially unacceptable by the majority, and the minority voters 
supporting those candidates, have had their Fourteenth or Fifteenth 
Amendment rights infringed by this process."75 Instead, the Court 
minimized the consequences, "[h]owever disagreeable," by including 
them within the norms of political life: the position of the Hasidic 
Jewish minority "is similar to that of the Democratic or Republican 
minority that is submerged year after year by the adherents to the 
majority party who tend to vote a straight party line."76 
The legislative history of the 1982 amendments introduces the for-
mal recognition of racially polarized voting patterns as a crucial ingre-
dient of a vote dilution claim. The inclusion of the polarized voting 
inquiry as the second of the reconstituted list of White/Zimmer fac-
tors marks a major shift in voting rights law.77 That addition for the 
first time pointed to an emerging doctrinal coherence for claims of 
72. 425 U.S. at 144 (White, J., dissenting). 
73. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
74. In a plurality opinion, Justice White, joined by Justices Stevens and Rehnquist, found 
two reasons why the defeat of electoral aspirations as a result of polarized voting patterns did not 
offend the Constitution. The first was based on the nature of the group in question, in this case 
Jews for whom the districting plan, according to Justice White, "represented no racial slur or 
stigma." 430 U.S. at 165. Alternatively, Justice White backed off his implied position in Beer to 
make clear that the Court was not prepared to have its voting rights jurisprudence hinge on the 
polarized voting insight into actual electoral behavior: 
Where it occurs, voting for or against a candidate because of his race is an unfortunate 
practice. But it is not rare; and in any district where it regularly happens, it is unlikely that 
any candidate will be elected who is a member of the race that is in the minority in that 
district. 
430 U.S. at 166-67 (opinion of White, J., joined by Stevens and Rehnquist, JJ.). 
75. 430 U.S. at 167. 
76. 430 U.S. at 167. 
77. These factors are combined in the legislative history as part of the evidentiary factors to 
be considered in challenges to at-large election systems. The factors are: 
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that 
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minority vote dilution. When stripped to its essentials, the paradig-
matic claim of minority vote dilution under the amended Voting 
Rights Act would now incorporate three basic features: (1) structural 
obstacles to the electoral success of minorities, such as at-large elec-
tions; (2) behavioral patterns that interact with the structural obstacles 
to exaggerate the political power of the majority - i.e., racially po-
larized voting; and (3) a resulting underrepresentation or even com-
plete lack of representation of the minority community relative to its 
proportion of the population. 
Congress accomplished two things by formally introducing the po-
larized voting inquiry into the accepted pantheon of vote-dilution evi-
dentiary factors, although neither is explicated in the legislative 
history. First, it began to give an operational meaning to vote dilution 
claims, following the lead of some lower federal courts prior to 
Bolden. 18 Second, the new statutory standard provided federal courts 
with a mechanism to inquire openly into the outcomes of actual voting 
practices while circumventing what Professor Levinson terms the 
"brooding omnipresence" of proportional representation. 79 The statu-
tory language of section 2 contains a proviso80 disclaiming the politi-
touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to 
participate in the democratic process; 
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially 
polarized; 
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election 
districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or 
procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have 
been denied access to that process; 
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision 
bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which 
hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in 
the jurisdiction. 
Two additional factors of lesser evidentiary significance are mentioned: 
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the 
particularized needs of the members of the minority group[; and] whether the policy under-
lying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to vot-
ing, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. 
S. REP. No. 417, supra note 67, at 28-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206-07 (footnotes 
omitted). 
78. See, e.g., Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223 n.16 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[I]n the absence of 
[racially] polarized voting, black candidates could not be denied office because they were black, 
and a case of ... dilution could not be made."), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980). 
79. See Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional 
Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 257 (1985) (arguing that pressures 
toward proportional representation are the inevitable byproduct of modern voting rights 
jurisprudence). 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988) ("[N]othing in this section establishes a right to have mem-
bers of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population."). 
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cally thorny problem of any right to proportional representation. 81 At 
the same time, the "functional" application of the Senate Report evi-
dentiary factors would direct the inquiry back to the actual success 
rates of minority-supported candidates compared to rates that would 
have occurred if "undiluted" minority voting strength had held 
sway. 82 As Chief Justice Rehnquist has written, the very concept of 
vote dilution "itself suggests a norm with respect to which the fact of 
dilution may be ascertained."83 While declining to base that norm on 
proportional representation per se, 84 the inquiry into voting practices 
brought about a comparable result by establishing the voting practices 
of the majority and minority communities as the evidentiary 
benchmarks of amended section 2 vote dilution claims. 85 
C. Thornburg v. Gingles 
With the passage of the statutory voting rights amendments in 
1982, lower federal courts lost no time in recasting case law to focus 
on an evidentiary inquiry into actual voting patterns. The Eleventh 
Circuit laid the groundwork in a trio of cases decided in 1984. 86 While 
allowing for the possibility that a vote dilution claim could be made 
81. Congressional debates on the 1982 amendments demonstrated widespread opposition to 
any requirement of proportional representation. See PERTSCHUK, supra note 67, at 177-78 (not· 
ing that last-minute amendment incorporating the anti-proportional representation proviso "gave 
reassurance to legislators who had genuine reservations but believed in voting rights"); ABIGAIL 
THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES CouN'I1 128 (1987) ("Frankly embracing proportional represen-
tation as a minority right was politically out of the question."). 
82. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 88 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
83. Mississippi Republican Executive Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002, 1012 (1984) (Rehn· 
quist, J., dissenting from summary affinnance). As Justice Scalia colorfully queried from the 
bench during argument in Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991), "'You don't know what 
watered beer is unless you know what beer is, right?' " Lyle Denniston, Split Argument Pays Ojf 
in Voting Rights Case, AM. LAW., Sept. 1991, at 103 (quoting Scalia, J.). One assumes that any 
play on the leading case defining retrogression in minority voting strength, Beer v. United States, 
425 U.S. 130 (1976), was unintentional. 
84. But cf TRIBE, supra note 31, at 1080 ("When those bringing such claims [of a right to 
proportional representation] are members of minority races, not only the Voting Rights Act, but 
also our history and Constitution suggest that this cost is well worth bearing."); John R. Low-
Beer, Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 163 
(1984) (arguing that reliance on proportional representation is ultimately the only way to balance 
minority representation and majority rule). 
85. In reviewing the scope of § 2, Justice O'Connor wrote, "[A]ny theory of vote dilution 
must necessarily rely to some extent on a measure of minority voting strength that makes some 
reference to the proportion between the minority group and the electorate at large." Gingles, 478 
U.S. at 84. Despite her reservations, Justice O'Connor concurred in finding that § 2 prohibited 
just such a dilution of voting strength. 
86. See Lee County Branch of NAACP v. City of Opelika, 748 F.2d 1473 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(remanding for application ofpost-1982 voting rights statutory standard); United States v. Dallas 
County Commn., 739 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1984) (same); United States v. Marengo County 
Commn., 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984) (striking down at-large election of county commission-
ers in Alabama), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984). 
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out even in the absence of racially polarized voting, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit stressed that "this factor will ordinarily be the keystone of a dilu-
tion case."87 The "keystone" view of polarized voting quickly became 
the dominant interpretation of the amended Voting Rights Act in the 
lower federal courts. 88 
The Supreme Court did not squarely address polarized voting until 
1986. In Thornburg v. Gingles, 89 the Court for the first time attempted 
to define the mechanism by which multimember elections compro-
mised the effectiveness of the minority franchise. Following the lead 
of the lower federal courts, the Court fastened on the polarized voting 
inquiry as the heart of a vote dilution claim. Without proof of po-
larized voting patterns, the Court held, "it cannot be said that the 
selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts distinctive mi-
nority group interests."9° 
But Gingles did not merely ratify the statutory standards of 
amended section 2. Rather, the Court decisively recast the evidentiary 
factors from the legislative record of the 1982 amendments to the Act. 
Instead of the enhanced multipart inquiry into the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" inherited from White and Zimmer, the Gingles Court fo-
cused on the statutory mandate to create a "functional" approach to 
the problem of electoral inequality.91 Gingles brought the racially po-
larized voting inquiry into the undisputed and unchallenged center of 
the Voting Rights Act: "The purpose of inquiring into the existence of 
racially polarized voting is twofold: to ascertain whether minority 
group members constitute a politically cohesive unit and to determine 
whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minor-
ity's preferred candidates."92 The nonelectoral evidentiary elements 
inherited from the White/Zimmer line of cases were discounted as 
"supportive of, but not essential to, a minority voter's claim."93 Vote 
dilution was to be measured by the actual electoral practices of the 
87. Marengo County, 731 F.2d at 1566. Although the Eleventh Circuit claimed that the 
primary role of polarized voting was mandated by the legislative history of the 1982 amend-
ments, 731 F.2d at 1566-67, the authoritative Senate committee report refers to polarized voting 
only twice, once in adding it to the White/Zimmer factors and once in defending the new statu-
tory results test against criticism that § 2 would assume " 'that race is the predominant determi-
nant of political preference'" rather than requiring that this be proved. S. REP. No. 417, supra 
note 67, at 33, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 211 (quoting criticism from the Subcommittee 
Report). 
88. See McMillan v. Escambia County, 748 F.2d 1037, 1041-43 (5th Cir. 1984). 
89. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
90. 478 U.S. at 51. 
91. 478 U.S. at 45 (quoting S. REP. No. 417, supra note 67, at 30 n.120, reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 208 n.120). 
92. 478 U.S. at 56. 
93. 478 U.S. at 49 n.15. 
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day, and the polarized voting inquiry was to be its evidentiary 
centerpiece. 
The result was a three-part test that signaled the emergence of po-
larized voting as the real measure of vote dilution. First, minority 
plaintiffs must prove that they are sufficiently numerous and geo-
graphically compact to constitute a minority-dominated single-mem-
ber district.94 Second, the minority community must be "politically 
cohesive," i.e., must express common electoral aspirations.95 Third, 
plaintiffs must show that a corresponding pattern of bloc voting by the 
majority community has, over time, generally led to the defeat of mi-
nority-supported candidates.96 As one district court summarized the 
Gingles standard: 
Without establishing the first condition, the minority group cannot show 
that it has even the potential to elect the candidate of its choice in the 
absence of the alleged discriminatory practice. The final two require-
ments comprise the foundation for a finding that racial vote polarization 
exists. Establishment of these two conditions demonstrates that the 
black minority usually votes for one candidate, and the white majority 
votes for and elects a different candidate. If this racial vote polarization 
exists, then the minority voters have shown that "submergence in a 
white multi-member district impedes its ability to elect its chosen 
94. 478 U.S. at 50-51. The focus on minority population concentration as a precondition for 
a remedy places voting rights law somewhat apart from the normal integrationist thrust of civil 
rights reform. For criticisms of the view that geographic concentration should be a prerequisite 
to a successful vote dilution claim, see Richard L. Engstrom et al., Cumulative Voting as a Rem· 
edy for Minority Vote Dilution: The Case of Alamogordo, New Mexico, 5 J.L. & PoL. 469, 472 
(1989) (showing that alternative voting remedies can provide electoral opportunity even to dis-
persed minority voters); Karlan, supra note 47 (criticizing unduly narrow restrictions of requir-
ing concentration in majority-dominated single-member districts); Dana R. Carstaphson, Note, 
The Single Transferable Vote: Achieving the Goals of Section 2 Without Sacrificing the Integra-
tion Ideal, 9 YALE L. & POLY. REv. 405 (1991) (by making residential segregation a prerequisite 
for vote dilution remedies, Gingles created a direct conflict between voting rights claims and the 
integration ideal; Court should consequently eliminate the geographic compactness requirement). 
95. 478 U.S. at 50-51. The term politically cohesive, which had no precedent in existing case 
law, was drawn from commentators James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. 
Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amend-
ment?, 34 liAsTINGS L.J. 1, 51-55, 58·60 & n.344 (1982); Walter L. Carpeneti, Legislative Appor-
tionment: Multimember Districts and Fair Representation, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 666, 696-97 
(1972); and Davidson, supra note 69, at 4. 
Some courts initially treated the "cohesiveness" factor as requiring an extraordinary level of 
uniformity in the socioeconomic status and cultural activities of the minority community. See, 
e.g., Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1414-16 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing district 
court's reliance on expert testimony of socioeconomic differences among Hispanic voters to con-
clude that the Hispanic community was too apathetic to be politically cohesive). Over time, 
however, the courts have treated this second Gingles factor as be a proxy for racial bloc voting by 
the minority community. See Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488, 1493 (10th Cir. 1989) (racially 
polarized voting indicates political cohesion); Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 
(5th Cir. 1988) ("[A] minority group is politically cohesive if it votes together."); Collins v. City 
of Norfolk, 816 F.2d 932, 935 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he existence of racially polarized l'Oting . .• 
establishes ... cohesiveness of the minority group .... "). 
96. 478 U.S. at 50-51. 
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representatives. ,,97 
With Gingles, the Court effectively rejected even Congress' modified 
White/Zimmer standard and, in the name of upholding the amended 
Act, rewrote the statutory inquiry.98 As Justice O'Connor commented 
in her concurring opinion, under Gingles, "the basic contours of a vote 
dilution claim require no reference to most of the [White/Zimmer fac-
tors] ... which were highlighted in the Senate Report .... [E]lectoral 
success has now emerged, under the Court's standard, as the linchpin 
of vote dilution claims .... "99 
Following Gingles, voting rights litigation considers almost exclu-
sively actual voting patterns to determine the validity of at-large elec-
tion systems under the Voting Rights Act. 100 This brings us to the 
second issue: why the focus on polarized voting as the cornerstone of 
the Court's voting rights jurisprudence? 
97. McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (quoting Gingles, 
478 U.S. at 51) (citations omitted). 
98. This article does not consider the detailed and highly technical controversies over the 
statistical methods by which racially polarized voting is established. Prior to Gingles, some 
courts had criticized statistical methods that focused exclusively on the outcomes of voting prac-
tices and failed to explain why white and black voting patterns might diverge. See, e.g., Jones v. 
City of Lubbock, 730 F.2d 233, 233-36 (5th Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J, specially concurring). 
Under this view, more sophisticated tools such as multivariate analyses, presumably capable of 
disaggregating racial from nonracial reasons for voting patterns, would be required as part of 
plaintiffs' proof. This trend in the law was curtailed by Gingles, which equated such an inquiry 
into the reason for divergent voting patterns with a return to the Bolden intent standard. See 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 52-74 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (upholding use of bivariate regression analysis 
and homogeneous precinct analysis as preferred analytic tools to measure voting patterns). 
Since Gingles, the courtroom battles in voting rights cases have involved ever more complex 
methods of statistical modeling: defendants have attempted to show the shortcomings in regres-
sion analyses, while plaintiffs have attempted to shore up the basic methodology utilized by 
plaintiffs' expert Bernard Grofman in the Gingles litigation. See Bernard Grofman, Criteria for 
Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77 (1985) (setting forth basic meth-
odology). These issues broke out into open warfare in the recent successful challenge to the 
districting lines for county supervisor in Los Angeles County. See Garza v. County of Los Ange-
les, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 681 (1991) (war of experts in which 
defendants brought two chairmen of statistics departments and a theoretical physicist to attack 
plaintiffs' methodology; plaintiffs countered with political scientist Professor Grofman of the 
Gingles case and two highly regarded quantitative historians and experienced expert witnesses, 
Allan Lichtman and J. Morgan Kousser). The Los Angeles litigation has now spilled over into 
the academic journals with a fierce battle on methods. See David A. Freedman et al., Ecological 
Regression and Voting Rights, 15 EVALUATION REV. 673 (1991) (defendants' experts); Bernard 
Grofman, Statistics Without Substance: A Critique of Freedman et al. and Clark and Morrison, 
15 EVALUATION REV. 746 (1991); Allan J. Lichtman, Passing the Test: Ecological Regression 
Analysis in the Los Angeles County Case and Beyond, 15 EVALUATION REv. 770 (1991). 
99. 478 U.S. at 92-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
100. See, e.g., Collins v. City of Norfolk, 816 F.2d 932, 935-38 (4th Cir. 1987); Buckanaga v. 
Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.2d 469, 471-73 (8th Cir. 1986); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 
1183, 1202 (S.D. Miss. 1987); McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (C.D. Ill. 
1987). 
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II. POLICING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
Racial bloc voting is a prominent feature of American politics. 
The contours of racially identifiable voting patterns are readily evident 
in the national campaigns of Jesse Jackson in 1984 and 1988,101 in 
David Duke's unsuccessful race for governor of Louisiana, 102 in the 
consolidation of white support behind the Republican party,103 and in 
the use of more-or-less veiled racial imagery, as with the Willie Horton 
ads, 104 to secure the support of white voters. Even the notable break-
through successes of black candidates in the 1980s evidence the nag-
ging persistence of racial voting patterns. The pioneering elections of 
a black Mississippi congressman, a black governor in Virginia, and a 
black mayor in New York City were notable not only for the electoral 
emergence of a new generation of minority politicians, but for the pau-
city of white support garnered by each of the winning candidates. The 
levels of white support for Congressman Mike Espy (12%),105 Gover-
101. In the 1984 campaign, Jackson never received more than nine percent of white votes in 
any state for which exit polls were available. BOB FAW & NANCY SKELTON, THUNDER JN 
AMERICA 219 (1986). In 1988, Jackson won only 10% of the white vote. GARRY WILLS, 
UNDER Goo: RELIGION AND AMERICAN PoLmcs 266 (1990). "For all of Jesse Jackson's 
hoopla about a 'rainbow' coalition, it proved an illusion, with black the dominant color and all 
but a total break with other racial and ethnic groups." Philip Perlmutter, Black Activism Can't 
Afford lo Go It Alone, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Oct. 3, 1985, at 18. 
102. Duke, the Republican candidate and former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, re· 
ceived 55% of the white vote but only 4% of the black vote. Little Comfort in Mr. Duke's Loss, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at A14 (editorial). Among an exclusively white electorate, Duke 
would today be governor of Louisiana. 
103. A recent major work argues that racial issues were decisive in the coalescing of Republi· 
can Party dominance in presidential elections. See THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, 
CHAIN REACTION (1991). The Edsalls report, for example, that a 1980 survey of voters con· 
eluded that 68.8% of voters believed the Democratic Party was likely to aid minorities, as op-
posed to 11.9% who believed it was not. By contrast, only 11.4% believed the Republicans 
would aid minorities, while 65.8% thought they would not. Id. at 150. By 1986, "fully 56 
percent of blacks saw Reagan as racist." Id. at 139. The Edsalls argue that racial attitudes after 
the 1960s "became a central characteristic of both ideology and party identification, integral to 
voters' choices between Democrats and Republicans, and integral to choices between policy posi· 
tions on a range of non-racial issues traditionally identified with liberalism and conservatism." 
Id. at 151; see also CHANDLER DAVIDSON, RACE AND CLASS JN TEXAS POLITICS 234-39 (1990) 
(describing emergence of Republican party in Texas as largely based on white reaction to civil 
rights claims). 
This trend was anticipated by Republican strategist Kevin Phillips, the architect of the suc· 
cessful "Southern strategy" employed by President Nixon in his 1968 campaign. KEVIN P. 
PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (1969). According to Phillips, the 
semiveiled racial themes surrounding busing remedies in the maverick 1968 presidential cam· 
paign of George Wallace provided a "way station" for Southern and ethnic whites to abandon 
the Democratic Party and enter the ranks of the Republicans. "The principal force which broke 
up the Democratic (New Deal) coalition is the Negro socioeconomic revolution and liberal Dem· 
ocratic ideological inability to cope with it." Id. at 37. 
104. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 103, at 19, 114 (describing role of Horton ads in 
creating a racially charged electoral context). 
105. In 1986 Espy became the first black congressman from Mississippi since Reconstruc· 
tion. Gloria Borger, Crossing the Color Line, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 6, 1989, at 22, 
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nor Douglas Wilder (41%),106 and Mayor David Dinkins (27%),107 
amounted to roughly the same or less than the total votes for such 
recent landslide presidential losers as Barry Goldwater (38%), George 
McGovern (38%), and Walter Mondale (41 %).108 Even the most suc-
cessful black politicians would be routine landslide losers at the hands 
of the white electorate. 
So persistent are racial voting patterns that if one wished to predict 
the election of minority officeholders, particularly black elected offi-
cials, the racial composition of the jurisdiction would be the one indis-
pensable piece of evidence. There is but one black governor in the 
United States and no black senators; only three of twenty-four black 
representatives were elected from majority-white congressional dis-
tricts.109 Similarly, there are no Hispanic senators, and no Hispanic 
representatives from majority-Anglo districts.110 As the case law 
throughout the 1980s established with dismaying regularity, racial 
bloc voting is the single most salient feature of contemporary political 
life in this country. 111 Minorities may have scored impressive gains in 
23. However, he gathered only 12% of the white vote. Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 
1194 (S.D. Miss. 1987). 
106. Wilder became the first black governor of Virginia in 1989 with 41% of the white vote. 
Michael K. Frisby, The New Black Politics, BOSTON GLOBE, July 14, 1991 (Magazine), at 14. 
107. In 1989, 27% of the white voters in New York City voted for Dinkins, the city's first 
black mayor. Id. This pattern was even more pronounced in the 1991 election of Willie Her-
enton as the first black mayor of Memphis, Tennessee. Mayor Herenton received between 10% 
and 15% of the white vote. Bill Nichols, Upset Win in Memphis Marks "New Beginning," USA 
TODAY, Oct. 7, 1991, at 2A. 
108. Republican Barry Goldwater won 38.47% of the popular vote in the 1964 presidential 
election. CoNGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 297 (Robert A. Diamond 
ed., 1975). Democrat George McGovern won 37.53% of the popular vote in 1972. Id. at 299. 
Democrat Walter Mondale won 41 % of the popular vote in 1984. THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-
BOOK 1985-1986, at 1374 (John Paxton ed., 122d ed. 1985). 
109. The three are Democrats Ronald Dellums of California and Alan Wheat of Missouri 
and Connecticut's Gary Franks, who in 1990 became the first black Republican to be elected to 
the House in 56 years. CoNGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S PoLmcs IN AMERICA 1992: THE 
102ND CoNGRESS 124-25, 853-54, 270-71 (Phil Duncan ed., 1991). 
110. See id. 
111. The finding of racially polarized voting patterns is so routine in voting rights cases that 
this inquiry is most noteworthy when it is not present. Post-Gingles cases finding persistent 
patterns of racially polarized voting include Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 
F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987) (upholding district court's finding of racial bloc voting in municipal 
elections), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989); Ewing v. Monroe County, 740 F. Supp. 417, 421 
(N.D. Miss. 1990) (adopting expert's finding of "severe and persistent racial polarization" in 
Monroe County); Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285, 298-99, 302 (M.D. La. 1988) ("pro-
nounced and persistent" statewide pattern of racially polarized voting in Louisiana), vacated sub 
nom. Clark v. Roemer, 750 F. Supp. 200 (M.D. La. 1990), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 
2881 (1991); McDaniels v. Mehfoud, 702 F. Supp. 588, 593-94 (E.D. Va. 1988) (ecological re-
gression analysis and testimony of black community leaders establish continuing patterns of ra-
cially polarized voting); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1193-94 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (same); 
McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1028 (C.D. Ill. 1987) ("[E]xtended analysis of 
voting in local elections in Springfield demonstrates that 'in races where there is a black candi-
date, most blacks vote for the black. White voters overwhelmingly prefer white candidates under 
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achieving elective office, 112 but with only a handful of exceptions, 113 
these gains did not correspond to a notable breakdown in racial lines 
of voting. 114 Rather, the increased number of minority elected officials 
is most directly attributable to the successes of redistricting and reap-
portionment litigation and the resulting creation of more minority-
dominated electoral districts. 
Thus, the transformation of voting rights law through the focus on 
actual voting patterns gave to voting rights claims a resilience un-
matched in any other area of civil rights law in the 1980s. That Ron-
ald Reagan should have been elected to office in 1980, the nadir of the 
substantive voting rights law under the rule of City of Mobile v. 
Bolden, is ironic. By the time President Reagan left office, eight years 
and three Supreme Court appointments later, the governing law had 
not only repaired the damage of Bolden but had provided a far more 
beneficial regime for plaintiffs' claims than even under White and Zim-
mer. No other area of civil rights law came close to matching this 
history in the 1980s. 
A. The Right To Vote as a Group-Based Claim 
Ever since the Court's entry into the "political thicket"115 with the 
the same circumstances. This is racially polarized voting.") (quoting and adopting a finding from 
one of plaintiffs' exhibits); Jackson v. Edgfield County, S.C. Sch. Dist., 650 F. Supp. 1176, 1198 
(D.S.C. 1986) (noting that persistent and severe racial bloc voting "indicates that race still is a 
predominant influence over the electorate's preferences"). 
The author served as counsel to plaintiffs in several of the above-listed cases. 
112. Since the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the number of black elected officials has 
increased from roughly 500 in 1965 to approximately 7200 in 1989. FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK 
VOTES CouNT 1 (1990). The dramatic expansion of black electoral opportunity is best seen in 
Mississippi, as chronicled by Frank Parker. Before 1965, there were but six black elected officials 
in a state that was roughly 40% black; by 1989 that number had jumped to 646, the highest of 
any state in the country. Id. at 2. The progression was anything but smooth and orderly. After 
the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the tremendous surge of black voter registra-
tion, the state responded by creating multimember legislative and local election units for the 
purpose of, and with the effect of, denying electoral opportunity to newly registered black voters. 
Id. at 34-77. Only after the elimination of at-large and multimember districts through years of 
litigation did black electoral success begin to take hold. Id. at 130-66. 
113. Among the notable exceptions are black mayors of major U.S. cities in which whites are 
the majority population, such as Wellington E. Webb of Denver and Norman Rice of Seattle. 
Jonathan Tilove, Political Integration, MONTREAL GAZETIE, Sept. 3, 1991, at BJ. 
114. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on 
Black Representation in Southern State Legislatures, 16 LEGlS. STUD. Q. 111 (1991) (no decrease 
in polarized voting in the South over time). Professors Grofman and Handley's study found that, 
in 1989, only one percent of the 1534 southern state legislators from majority-white districts were 
black. In majority black districts, on the other hand, 139 of 233 elected legislators were black. 
Id. at 114. In another study, the same authors found that, in 1990, only six out of 142 southern 
congressmen were black in a region that is 18% black. Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, Pre-
conditions for Black and Hispanic Congressional Success, in THE ELECTION OF WOMEN AND 
MINORITIES (Wilma Rule & Joseph Zimmerman eds., forthcoming 1992). See generally 
Guinier, supra note 28, at 1112-13 (documenting persistence of polarized voting patterns). 
115. The term originates with Justice Frankfurter's stern warning in Colegrove v. Green, 328 
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one-person, one-vote reapportionment cases, 116 the specter of unbri-
dled judicial oversight of the political process has weighed heavily on 
the Court. As the Court recognized early on in reviewing the per se 
legality of at-large elections, each election contest necessarily features 
winners and losers. 117 The Court's jurisprudence in the electoral 
arena has amounted to an attempt, admittedly imprecise, to determine 
at what point the presumed legitimacy of the political process breaks 
down so as to transform the customary frustration of the vanquished 
into a compelling legal claim. Absent such a defined presumption in 
favor of the legitimacy of the process, there is no doctrinal stopping 
point short of a judicial assessment of the fairness of each election's 
outcome.118 
The fundamental issue in the electoral case law turns on the appar-
ently countermajoritarian nature of judicial intervention into the elec-
toral choices of the majority of voters. The early case law avoided the 
difficulties inherent in judicial review of actual election outcomes by 
focusing on individual rights in the political process. In the break-
through cases of Baker v. Carr 119 and Wesberry v. Sanders, 120 the 
Court rooted its oversight of the electoral process by declaring that 
U.S. 549, 556 (1946), that principled judicial oversight of the political process was impossible. 
For later criticisms of the nonjusticiability of election issues, see BORK, supra note 59, at 89-90 
(the Supreme Court's reapportionment cases were a "deformation of the Constitution [that] 
probably succumbed to the law of unintended consequences .•.. [T]he one man, one vote doc-
trine was not only illegitimate constitutional law but a political failure as well."). 
116. The abandonment of the political question doctrine came with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186 (1962), which in reversing the district court held that a challenge to the numerically malap-
portioned Tennessee legislature was a justiciable constitutional cause of action under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Two years later, the Court announced the one-person, one-vote rule for reap-
portionment in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The actual application of the one-person, 
one-vote rule to state apportionment plans, in practice, has allowed considerable latitude for the 
exercise of state discretion. Compare Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973) (16.4% devia-
tion from ideal state apportionment acceptable, although approaching "tolerable limits") with 
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (striking down congressional redistricting plan from 
New Jersey following 1980 census because of a population imbalance of less than one percent 
where the imbalance resulted from bad-faith reapportionment policies). 
117. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971) ("As our system has it, one candi-
date wins, the others lose."). This discussion assumes head-to-head contests in which the highest 
votegetter is elected to office. Under various proportional representation systems, losing parties 
able to muster significant percentages of the popular vote could be afforded representation. For 
an overview of the uses of nonmajoritarian voting systems, see Karlan, supra note 47. 
118. Indeed, with the recognition of claims based on fairness to the major political parties, 
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), the Court does seem to have opened the door to just 
that possibility. 
119. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
120. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). Although Wesberry construed the application of article I, § 2 of the 
Constitution to the election of the Georgia congressional delegation, the holding that "one man's 
vote ... is to be worth as much as another's," 376 U.S. at 8, parallels the Court's jurisprudence 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW§ 13-2 (2d ed. 1988). 
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each individual had the right to be part of an electoral district with 
equally weighted representation. 121 Thus, for example, the Court held 
that the complaint in Baker adequately stated a claim for relief where 
the voting power of a single voter in one county of Tennessee was 
worth nineteen times the voting power of a similarly situated voter in 
another part of the state.122 In announcing the formal one-person, 
one-vote rule in Reynolds v. Sims, 123 the Court unambiguously ex-
pressed the right to the franchise in terms of individual entitlements: 
"[A]n individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitution-
ally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when 
compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State."124 
Similarly, in striking down the exclusion of citizens who did not own 
or lease taxable real property or have children in the local public 
schools from local school board elections, the Court concentrated on 
the right of each citizen to "have an effective voice in school 
affairs." 125 
While the population-based apportionment cases eased the Court's 
path into the political thicket, they did little to adumbrate principles 
applicable to group-based exclusion. The critical, isolating feature of 
the pure vote dilution claim is the equality of apportionment across all 
citizens and the absence of any overt mechanism to prevent minorities 
from registering and voting. In the typical challenge to at-large elec-
tions, for example, each individual's vote is counted and weighed in 
the same manner and each individual is presumptively equal to the 
next in being able to register to vote and actually cast her ballot. The 
issue, as Justice Scalia skeptically phrased it, is not "equality of indi-
vidual votes" but "equality of minority blocs of votes."126 
As previously discussed, between Whitcomb and White the Court 
121. Although the standard of justiciable individual rights was set out in Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186 (1962), the Court articulated no substantive standard to guide future judicial inquiries. 
See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 257-60 
(1991). Only with Wesberry and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), did the Court articulate 
the substantive one-person, one-vote standard. 
122. 369 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
123. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The use of the term one person, one vote appears to have originated 
with Justice Douglas: "The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amend-
ments can mean only one thing - one person, one vote." Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 
(1963). 
124. 377 U.S. at 568. See generally TRIBE, supra note 31, at 1065-68 (describing difficulties 
in application of the one-person, one-vote rule); Samuel lssacharoff & Allan J. Lichtman, The 
Census Undercount and Minority Representation: The Constitutional Obligation of the States to 
Guarantee Equal Representation, NATL. BLACK L.J. (forthcoming 1992) (describing ambiguous 
commands of Reynolds and the one-person, one-vote principle). 
125. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 n.7 (1969). 
126. Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2374 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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shakily set the foundation for examining electoral outcomes to deter-
mine the fairness of the political process. Once the theme of electoral 
outcomes is introduced, the contrast with the early apportionment 
cases begins to emerge clearly. Under the one-person, one-vote stan-
dard, the Court weighed each individual's capacity to participate 
equally in the political process as she approached the ballot box. So 
long as access to the polls was assured and all voters stood in numeri-
cal equality prior to the actual voting processes, the apportionment 
inquiry was satisfied. What actually occurred in the election was not 
at issue. In order to find vote dilution, however, the Court of necessity 
began looking to the outcomes of the political process. This required 
turning away from the individual voter to determine how cognizable 
groups of voters fared in order to assess the fundamental fairness of 
the process. Outcome fairness can only be measured in the aggregate; 
a reviewing court "must have an idea in mind of how hard it 'should' 
be for minority voters to elect their preferred candidates under an ac-
ceptable system."127 This group-based inquiry stands at the heart of 
representative politics. As Justice Powell has written, "[t]he concept 
of 'representation' necessarily applies to groups: groups of voters elect 
representatives, individual voters do not." 128 This investigation into 
group rights inevitably led the Court away from the focus on access to 
the balloting process and forced it to turn its sights to a greater and 
greater extent to the actual voting practices of jurisdictions under 
challenge. 
The evolution of the Court's jurisprudence from Whitcomb and 
White to Gingles is therefore best understood as an attempt to consoli-
date the evidentiary criteria necessary for a group claim of vote dilu-
tion. The emergence of polarized voting patterns as the critical 
evidentiary issue in vote dilution claims corresponds to the shift from 
individual- to group-based perspectives in defining impediments to the 
full exercise of the franchise. As with Griggs under Title VII, the 
emergence of an expressly group-based inquiry under the Voting 
Rights Act, together with the evidentiary focus on polarized voting, 
invigorated the substantive law and dramatically increased the reach 
of statutory and constitutional protections of the right to vote. 
B. Judicial Oversight of the Political Process 
The group-based nature of the emerging minority vote dilution 
claims raises troubling questions concerning both the manageability of 
127. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 88 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
128. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
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the new standard and the reason for its existence. Although these are 
distinct issues, they arise from a common concern with the fundamen-
tal issue of judicial oversight of the political process. The focus on 
polarized voting patterns in these cases addresses the central underly-
ing concern of political legitimacy and may lend a coherence to the 
Court's voting rights jurisprudence that helps explain the Court's so-
licitude for these claims over the past decade. 
Behind each judicial determination that a particular voting system 
frustrates the electoral aspirations of minority voters stands an indict-
ment of majoritarian processes.129 The racially polarized voting in-
quiry gives the Court a healthy basis for skepticism concerning the 
majoritarian premise implicit in respect for the outcomes of elections. 
In the context of persistent racially polarized voting, the problem is 
not simply that some win and some lose. Rather, there is a predict-
ability to who wins and loses, and that predictability falls along racial 
lines. This is reflected in the threshold for legal intervention set forth 
in Gingles. Simple electoral defeat does not trigger the Voting Rights 
Act because only "a white bloc vote that normally will defeat the com-
bined strength of minority support plus white 'crossover' votes rises to 
the level of legally significant white bloc voting."I3o 
The existence of this racially defined majority voting faction raises 
concerns as old as the republic. Madison in The Federalist cautioned 
of the venomous role of factions in political life.131 But his particular 
concern was with majority factions that would be unrestrainable 
through the operation of the franchise: "If a majority be united by a 
common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure."132 Polit-
ical institutions must provide safeguards to "guard one part of the so-
ciety against the injustice of the other part."133 Madison affirmatively 
assigned to government the role of protecting against the tyranny bred 
129. At least two separate factors cause this countennajoritarian dilemma. Compare RON· 
ALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 178-80 (1986) (instinctive preferences for winner-take-all 
schemes) with ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (1962) (court 
intervention "thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it 
exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it"). 
130. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56. 
131. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). 
132. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), at 161 (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981); see also 
GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 36 & n.102 (1991); Julian N. Eule, Judicial 
Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1522-28 (1990) (depicting the Federalist caution 
about majority factions); Geoffrey P. Miller, Rights and Structure in Constitutional Theory, 8 
Soc. PHIL. & POLY. 196, 216 (1991) (observing that the challenge to the Madisonian conception 
of the republic was "to devise a means to retain the beneficial feature of popular government -
the propensity of popular governments to prevent abuse by the rulers - while minimizing the 
danger of faction"). 
133. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 132, at 161. 
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of the ruling passions or interests134 and to the judiciary the independ-
ent power to effectuate that protection.135 
Persistent polarized voting is the courtroom proof of the existence 
of not only a permanent faction, but a majority faction. There are 
innumerable majority factions in American life, ranging from anti-Na-
ziism to a near-universal rejection of the theory that the earth is fiat. 
Majority factionalism does not in itself provide a legitimating trigger 
for judicial intervention. Rather, courts must look to the defining fea-
tures of the majority and minority factions to justify 
countermajoritarian review. The polarized voting inquiry provides 
this justification by identifying a particular form of majority factional-
ism, one based on a repudiation of the political choices of historically 
disadvantaged minorities. 
Once polarized voting specifies the nature of the voting factions, 
the inquiry in the at-large election challenges is not directed so much 
to the permissibility of such factional behavior as to its consequences. 
Voting rights jurisprudence does not reach into the individual act of 
casting a ballot, regardless of whether the individual voter is motivated 
by racial, partisan, or any other concerns. The target of voting rights 
claims is not individual behavior, or even the creation of a racially 
defined majority faction; 136 it is the creation or maintenance of electo-
ral systems that reward that faction with superordinate representation. 
By allowing serial voting, at-large elections permit a cohesive, well-
financed majority community to reward itself with enhanced represen-
134. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); see also ROBINSON, supra note 132, at 47 
(arguing that the point of constitutional order is to impose constraints on majorities: "The true 
Hobbesian 'state of nature' is not primitive society but unconstrained majoritarian politics"); 
GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA 205 (1981) ("The whole point of representation is to 
'refine and enlarge the public views' by choosing men 'whose wisdom may best discern the true 
interest of their country.' These men turn their gaze from the partial and private interest to the 
public and common one ...• ")(quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 132, No. 10 (Madison), at 
21) (emphasis added by Wills). 
135. In introducing the Bill of Rights, Madison co=ented: 
If they [the Bill of Rights] are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of 
justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will 
be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or execu-
tive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated 
for in the constitution by the declaration of rights. 
1 CONG. DEB. 457 (Joseph Gales & William W. Seaton eds., 1834). 
136. Voting rights jurisprudence is unique within the constellation of civil rights claims in 
that the case law accepts the fact of racially divided voting patterns, once proved, and then seeks 
to create a remedial scheme that assumes the continuance of those voting patterns. As Professor 
Guinier notes: 
Rather than insisting that such separateness and difference be eradicated, as in the school 
desegregation context, or that poor blacks, isolated from and stigmatized by an unresponsive 
government, be afforded equal government services, as in equalization of municipal services 
litigation, the Voting Rights Act model of racial justice recognized racial difference. 
Guinier, supra note 28, at 1099 (footnote omitted). 
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tation, if not outright monopoly of representation. In the context of 
legislative elections, such "disproportionate majority power is, in it-
self, so wrong that it delegitimates majority rule."137 Combined with 
the greater wealth, education, and resources of the majority white 
community, white bloc voting robs representative systems of any pre-
sumed entitlement to deference. 
Judicial intervention, therefore, serves two distinct purposes, de-
spite the fact that it is not directed at the actual voting preferences that 
give rise to claims of minority vote dilution in the first place. First, it 
controls the potentially deleterious impact on the political process 
whenever stable majority factions emerge. Second, it protects a partic-
ularly vulnerable minority faction, one comprised of historically subju-
gated racial and ethnic minorities, from the electoral perils of 
untrammeled majority factionalism. Under this view, where electoral 
structures are "unable to guarantee a hearing for a variety of voices or 
to prevent factional domination, courts must pick up the slack and 
ensure that the majority governs in the interests of the whole 
people."13s 
C. Vote Dilution Under a Conservative Judiciary 
To identify the sources legitimating judicial oversight of the electo-
ral process is not to explain why voting rights claims should have 
fared so differently from other civil rights actions. In the same period 
when the Supreme Court was erecting nearly insuperable barriers to 
employment discrimination claims, 139 the Court strengthened the stat-
utory protections of voting rights in Gingles and then extended the 
scope of those statutory protections to encompass elected state judi-
ciaries.140 Why has judicial oversight of the electoral process generally 
137. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 11 VA. L. REV. 
1413, 1478 (1991); see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY JN AMERICA 240 (Henry 
Reeve trans., spec. ed. 1835) ("[T]he power to do everything, which I should refuse to one of my 
equals, I will never grant to any number of them."). 
138. Eule, supra note 132, at 1559. 
139. The 1988 term of the Supreme Court, for example, fundamentally transformed the law 
of employment discrimination. The Court recast the burdens of proof upon civil rights plaintiffs, 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); the scope of statutory protections 
against racial harassment, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); the proce-
dural hurdles to the vindication of civil rights claims, Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 
900 (1989); and, most notably, the permissible limits of local governmental efforts to benefit 
minority opportunity, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
140. See Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991); Houston Lawyers' Assn. v. Attorney 
Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991). The Court also strengthened the remedial powers of§ 5 by di· 
recting lower courts to enjoin the operation of unprecleared changes instead of allowing chal-
lenged elections to go forward on an interim basis. Clark v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2096 (1991). 
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become more exacting under an increasingly conservative federal 
bench? 
To address this paradox, it is necessary to disaggregate voting 
rights from the general rubric of civil rights claims. Because statutory 
and constitutional voting rights claims are typically brought in the 
name of minority citizens, there is a tendency to lump them into an 
undifferentiated pool of antidiscrimination law. Justice Marshall 
clearly identified this pattern in his Bolden dissent141 when he tried to 
restrain the expansion of the Washington v. Davis 142 intent standard 
from reaching the fundamental rights line of equal protection cases. 143 
According to Justice Marshall, voting rights cases involve "a substan-
tive constitutional right to participate on an equal basis in the electoral 
process that cannot be denied or diminished for any reason, racial or 
otherwise, lacking quite substantial justification."144 
Justice Marshall mildly overstated this proposition by relying 
heavily on Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny to set out the nonclassifi-
cation-based nature of voting rights claims.145 As developed above, 
there had been a decisive shift from the individual-rooted claims of the 
early apportionment cases to the group-based nature of the vote dilu-
tion claims. Nonetheless, Marshall was right to redirect the Court's 
attention to the distinction between typical civil rights claims and 
claims of interference with the fair operation of the electoral process. 
The standard claims to equality of opportunity in employment, hous-
ing, or education tum primarily on an individual's entitlement to pro-
tection from the hostility of the majority community. The voting 
rights claims involve both an element of individual rights to partici-
pate equally and, more centrally, a protection from fundamental pro-
cess distortions in the political arena. The latter insight is key for 
social scientists in defining the harms caused by at-large election 
mechanisms: "When voting patterns are polarized along racial lines 
... electoral competition can be structured in a manner that impedes a 
141. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 103-41 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
142. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring proof of invidious purpose or motive for equal protection 
challenge to state action having disproportionate impact on a suspect classification of the 
population). 
143. Equal protection analysis prior to Bolden turned on whether the right at stake was 
fundamental or whether the challenged state action affected a discrete group of the population. 
Examples of fundamental rights cases include Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (right to 
vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 
393 U.S. 23 (1968) (rights guaranteed by First Amendment); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 
(1963) (right to an adequate criminal defense); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 
535 (1942) (right to procreate). 
144. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 120 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
145. 446 U.S. at 116. 
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minority - even a sizable minority - from converting its voting 
strength into the election of minority candidates."I46 
The potential for exclusion inherent in at-large or multimember 
elections forces a confrontation with the heart of representative poli-
tics. Representative electoral systems can be looked at in terms of a 
hierarchy of outcomes. Ideally, politics should be a deliberative pro-
cess in which cross-cutting alliances will be formed on an issue-by-
issue basisI47 and in which race will not serve as the overriding cue for 
voting behavior. A secondary solution is to acknowledge the reality of 
racial bloc voting but to structure the electoral processes so as to dis-
tribute representational opportunity across all social groups. The un-
desirable third option is to have a political system that is characterized 
by racial voting patterns and that rewards the majority community 
with superordinate control of the outcomes. 
This hierarchy corresponds to the bottom-line insight of James 
Madison that "[t]here are two methods of curing the mischiefs of fac-
tion: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its ef-
fects."I48 Unfortunately, little evidence exists that the breakdown of 
at-large election systems has cured the problem of factions or moved 
American politics closer to any race-blind norm. In Madison's pessi-
mistic terms, it may then be that "the causes of faction cannot be re-
moved, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling 
its effects. "I49 This is where voting rights law has had substantial suc-
cess, as reflected in the evidence that the effects of polarized voting 
have been significantly tempered. Voting rights litigation of the past 
two decades has dramatically altered the inequitable distribution of 
representation that emerges from the combination of polarized voting 
and at-large elections. tso 
146. Richard L. Engstrom & Michael D. McDonald, The Election of Blacks to Southern City 
Councils: The Dominant Impact of Electoral Arrangements, in BLACKS IN SOUTHERN POLITICS 
245, 245 (Laurence W. Moreland et al. eds., 1987). 
147. See MAURICE DUVERGER, PoLmCAL PARTIES (Barbara North & Robert North trans., 
2d ed. 1959) (setting out relationship between structures of political systems and de"'.elopment of 
voting blocs); Guinier, supra note 137, at 1490 (arguing that breaking down voting systems that 
reward majority bloc voting will promote political stability by promoting nonpermanent, issue-
based alliances). 
148. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 132, No. 10 (Madison), at 17. 
149. Id. at 19. 
150. The most comprehensive study of the effect of voting rights litigation on the electoral 
success of candidates of choice of minority communities was undertaken by sociologist Chandler 
Davidson and political scientist Bernard Grofman. See CHANDLER DAVIDSON & BERNARD 
GROFMAN, CoNTROVERSIBS IN MINORITY VOTING: A TWENTY-FIVE YEAR PERSPECTIVE ON 
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (forthcoming 1992); see also Chandler Davidson & George 
Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation: A Reexamination of /tistorical 
and Contemporary Evidence, in MINORITY VoTB DILUTION, supra note 30, at 65, 71-74 (12 
studies tend to confirm hypoth~is that single-member districts afford blacks better chances for 
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The particular solicitude for voting rights claims under an increas-
ingly conservative federal judiciary can be partially explained by the 
uniqueness of voting rights claims amid the constellation of civil rights 
causes of action. Voting rights law can be defined by its strong ele-
ment of process correction applied on behalf of minorities who have 
been either shut out of or handicapped in entering the political sphere. 
That element of process correction separates voting rights claims from 
the purely outcome-driven civil rights claims against the distribution 
of goods and opportunities in this society. That same element of pro-
cess correction, however, introduces a decided limitation on the post-
Brown v. Board of Education commitment to constitutional protection 
of minority rights in this country. 
D. Voting Rights and Process Corrections 
Understanding the distinct treatment of vote dilution claims dur-
ing the 1980s requires returning to the unique features of voting rights 
law. The voting rights cases stand apart from typical antidiscrimina-
tion claims when viewed from the vantage point of restraining the pro-
cess distortions introduced by majority bloc voting in the context of 
at-large elections. Where the focus is on the coalescing of a majority 
faction, judicial intervention into the political arena should be seen not 
simply as a vindication of the rights of discrete and insular minorities 
but as the application of exacting judicial scrutiny to legislation which 
restricts the functioning of the political processes. The group-based 
nature of the vote dilution claim approximates the general panoply of 
civil rights actions in combatting "prejudice against discrete and insu-
lar minorities ... which tends seriously to curtail the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties," as formulated by the famous paragraph three of the Carotene 
Products footnote. 151 But the strong element of process distortion in 
the electoral arena also implicates a special constitutional solicitude 
for challenges to a law that "restricts those political processes which 
representation); Bernard Grofinan, Alternatives to Single-Member Plurality Distn"cts: Legal and 
Empirical Issues, in BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING IS-
SUES 107, 114-16 (1982) (collecting sources); Theodore P. Robinson & Thomas R. Dye, Reform-
ism and Black Representation on City Councils, 59 Soc. Ser. Q. 133 (1978) (finding black 
representation significantly increased in cities with districts rather than at-large elections); Del-
bert Taebel, Minority Representation on City Councils: The Impact of Structure on Blacks and 
Hispanics, 59 Soc. Ser. Q. 142 (1978) (finding relationship between districting and increased 
council representation both for blacks and Latinos). 
There is also some evidence that the prospect of minority electoral success through the elimi-
nation of at-large elections contributes to increased minority political participation, including 
actual turnout on election day. See Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-
Reagan Era, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 420 (1989). 
151. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legisla-
tion," as formulated by paragraph two of the Carolene Products 
footnote. 152 
For process-based constitutional theorists, cases implicating the 
closing of the political process stand at the core of legitimate, but nar-
row, judicial review. 153 As one defender of process-based theory 
would have it, "[i]t is difficult to imagine a more compelling case for 
judicial intervention on political process grounds than Baker v. Carr,· 
Tennessee legislators had proven fiercely resistant to reapportioning 
themselves out of a job, and even a 'civically militant electorate' was 
not about to budge them."154 The persistent exclusion of minority 
representatives as a result of majority bloc voting in at-large elections 
embodies the central argument of the process-based defense of the ap-
portionment cases: "when a numerical majority chooses a[n electoral] 
plan that shuts out a numerical minority, that plan is not in fact 'dem-
ocratic.' " 155 Because of the rewards to be reaped by the majority 
community if the at-large system is preserved, it is impossible to look 
to the voting process to legitimate electoral outcomes.156 Nor can 
there be reliance on the political process to protect or restore minority 
voting rights. Thus seen, judicial reaction against at-large election sys-
tems contaminated by majority bloc voting has the allure of restoring 
legitimacy to the basic functioning of the electoral process. 
The inquiry into racial bloc voting is critical to the application of 
process theory to vote dilution claims. Without a focus on actual elec-
toral practices, process theory provides no consistent guidance for an-
swering the question that has plagued the Supreme Court: how to 
152. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
153. The undisputedly leading work in this field is JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIS· 
TRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). Dean Ely attempts to define a limited, non-
nonnative theory of judicial review based upon the process-distortion theory of paragraph two of 
Carolene Products. Under such a theory, the apportionment cases loom large as a focal point for 
judicial intervention into the political process. See id. at 117. Ely, however, also tries to fit the 
more complex vote dilution cases, which do not readily present catch phrases like one person, one 
vote to guide judicial review, within the framework of process theory as well. For Ely, the defini· 
tion of a suspect class is its systematic exclusion from effective participation in the political pro· 
cess. Id. at 151-53. For extensive criticisms of Ely, see Symposium on Democracy and Distrust: 
Ten Years Later, 11 VA. L. REv. 631 (1991). Even defenders of Ely criticize the attempted 
incorporation of the suspect classification strain of equal protection within his process-based the· 
ories. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 11 VA. L. 
REv. 747, 773 (1991). 
154. Klarman, supra note 153, at 757-58 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) (footnotes omitted). 
155. Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting 
Rights Act, 11 VA. L. REv. 1, 14 (1991). 
156. See Note, supra note 66, at 346 (arguing that deference to majoritarian legislative deci· 
sions in vote dilution cases "is absurd on its face; the vindication of voting rights can hardly be 
trusted to the very representatives whose election is the result of the alleged vote dilution"), 
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distinguish the simple act of electoral loss from broader systemic fail-
ures of the electoral process. Standing alone, pure process theory 
could not draw the "distinction between cases in which a group . . . 
loses on a particular issue or series of issues and cases in which a group 
is permanently excluded from effective political participation by the 
refusal of other groups to deal with it."157 Nor could process theory 
without an operational component rebut the even more extreme claim 
that "whichever group happens to lose the political struggle or fails to 
command the attention of the legislature ... is - by that fact alone -
a discrete and insular minority."15s 
As formulated by Dean Guido Calabresi: 
When an identifiable social group has been consistently and significantly 
underrepresented or in other ways excluded from the legislative process, 
traditional political processes cannot be relied upon to protect that 
group. The courts must therefore step in to guard the group from unjus-
tified selective treatment, that is, discrimination. The group must not be 
just a temporary political loser. It must have experienced a history of 
discrimination or must face a real danger of long-run exclusion.159 
The polarized voting analysis, therefore, energizes and concretizes 
a process-based approach to judicial oversight of the electoral arena. 
But that is only half the story. In addition to lending doctrinal coher-
ence, process-based reforms hold a separate allure for a conservative 
judiciary. Together with allowing courts to claim an exclusive process 
focus on "how politics should work"160 stands the strong tendency of 
such an approach to evade the problematic questions of outcome fair-
ness. As Professor Brilmayer contends, "[i]f process were Carolene's 
true focus, then it would not matter whether a particular legislative 
outcome is good or bad. From a process viewpoint, an individual or a 
group should be allowed to participate in political decisionmaking re-
gardless of whether it will make any difference to the result."161 
The limitations inherent in process-based theories are apparent in 
157. Douglas Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review, 59 
TEXAS L. REV. 343, 380-81 (1981) (book review). 
158. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1979) (criticizing the apparent attraction of process·based theories of judi-
cial review). 
159. Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term - Foreword: Antidiscrimination and 
Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores}, 105 HARV. L. REv. 80, 
91 (1991) (referring favorably to this standard of review as "Type II" judicial enforcement of the 
antidiscrimination principle). 
160. Laurence H. Tnoe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theon"es, 89 
YALE L.J. 1063, 1063 (1980). 
161. Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Insider-Outsider," 134 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1291, 1313 (1986); see also ELY, supra note 153, at 102 n.* (admitting worries over what 
full process-based theory would mean for civil liberties claims); Tribe, supra note 160, at 1079-80 
(speculating on likely impact of process-based theories on constitutional decisionmaking). 
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the second major consequence of the polarized voting inquiry in vote 
dilution cases: the elimination of prior case law requiring intrusive 
court review of the outcomes of the political process. 162 In the case 
law prior to the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, the issue 
of "nonresponsiveness" of elected bodies to the needs and interests of 
the minority community was a central focus of litigation. 163 The in-
quiry into a "significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected 
officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority 
group" was carried forward as part, albeit a subordinate part, of the 
statutory standard of amended section 2 of the Act164 until Gingles 
effectively discarded it. 
By looking to process failure in the capture of superordinate repre-
sentation by a majority voting bloc, the polarized voting inquiry 
spared the courts the need to review each item of legislative decision-
making and, if need be, to strike it down as racially invidious.165 This 
process-oriented inquiry into voting patterns is attractive to the courts 
as a proxy for the broader issue of the distributional consequences of 
political decisionmaking. In an important recent article, Professor 
Guinier challenges the limitations inherent in focusing on electoral 
outcomes and using simple access to representation as a proxy for the 
broader remedial aims that the franchise was thought to offer the civil 
rights movement. 166 She argues that the focus on voting patterns 
162. This theme has been sounded consistently through the case law reviewing all aspects of 
the political process. For example, in an interview conducted just before his retirement, Chief 
Justice Earl Warren explained that apportionment 
is perhaps the most important issue we have had before the Supreme Court. If everyone in 
this country has an opportunity to participate in his government on equal terms with every-
one else and can share in electing representatives who will be truly representative of the 
entire community and not some special interest, then most of these problems that we are 
now confronted with would be solved through the political process rather than through the 
courts. 
Excerpts From Interview With Wa"en on His Court's Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1969, at 
17. 
163. See, e.g., Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1375 (5th Cir. 1981), a.ffd. sub nom. Rogers 
v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 146 (5th Cir.), 
cert denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en 
bane), a.ffd. sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). 
164. See S. REP. No. 417, supra note 67, at 29 n.116, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 
n.116 (unresponsiveness a relevant inquiry to the extent plaintiffs introduce evidence on this 
point). 
165. See Guinier, supra note 137, at 1510-13 (proposing procedural protections of defeated 
minority interests to spare courts from overly intrusive item-by-item review of local legislative 
decisions). 
166. Guinier, supra note 28, at 1096-101. Professor Guinier argues that the 1982 amend-
ments to the Voting Rights Act cemented a limited version of black electoral opportunity that 
focused overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, on the numbers of black elected officials. The effect 
of this view of electoral opportunity, she argues, was threefold: 
[F]irst, it provided a successful litigation approach to challenge the failure of the election to 
produce elected black officials; second, it gave courts a justiciable standard to determine the 
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emerged primarily because a limited inquiry fit the needs of the institu-
tional voting rights plaintiffs' bar for whom the "responsiveness" in-
quiry was too burdensome and too unpredictable and that it 
consequently sheltered the courts from the more exacting and often-
times unmanageable inquiry into the results of the exercise of political 
power.167 
The lesson of the past decade is that voting rights claims gather 
force to the extent that process-based claims can relieve a conservative 
judiciary of any obligation to police the substantive distributional out-
comes of the policy decisions of elected political bodies. The one re-
cent Supreme Court decision curtailing the breadth of voting rights 
protections brought this limitation into sharper relief. In Presley v. 
Etowah County Commission, 168 the Court restricted the scope of the 
preclearance requirement of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to mat-
ters that have a "direct relation to, or impact on, voting" and, accord-
ingly, refused to extend the coverage of section 5 to the actual duties of 
elected county commissioners once in office.169 The Court, while leav-
ing the substantive reach of the Act to the electoral process un-
restricted, candidly declared that, at its core, the "Voting Rights Act 
is not an all-purpose antidiscrimination statute."170 
In fairness, it must be recognized that there are tremendous diffi-
culties in extending the struggle for equality of political opportunity to 
a normative vision of what the yields of a substantively fair political 
process should be. An initial difficulty stems from the unbounded na-
ture of the inquiry. A typical vote dilution case focusing on the unre-
sponsiveness of elected representatives may require courts to weigh the 
quality and funding levels oflocal schools; the hiring practices oflocal 
public agencies; the appointment processes to administrative boards, 
committees, and judicial offices; and the allocation of municipal serv-
ices such as road construction and repair. 171 In the guise of challeng-
problems and progress that were closely related to the ultimate limits of the voting rights 
inquiry; and third ... it "inescapably closed the door'' on the real goal of the civil rights 
movement, which was to alter the material condition of the lives of America's subjugated 
minorities. 
Id. at 1101. 
167. Id. at 1096 & n.88. 
168. 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992) (refusing to apply§ 5 to county commissioners' internal realloca-
tion of authority in a manner that curtailed the powers of newly elected black commissioners). 
169. 112 S. Ct. at 830. 
170. 112 S. Ct. at 832. 
171. All of these factors were present in the record in Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358 (5th 
Cir. 1981), ajfd. sub nom. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). See 639 F.2d at 1376-77. This 
elaborate factual record is by no means atypical. See Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 95, at 43 
n.283 (arguing that inquiry into unresponsiveness is so open-ended that it becomes completely 
unmanageable in the courts). 
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ing a structural distortion in the election process, voting rights 
litigation became the forum for challenges to every conceivable facet 
of local decisionmaking. 
The responsiveness inquiry served as the political equivalent of an-
titrust.172 The electoral arena was viewed as a political marketplace in 
which competing social factions acquire legislative goods through the 
representative process. An overconcentration of goods in the hands of 
one faction is an evil akin to monopoly pricing. By identifying the 
outcome distortion in the distribution of legislative goods, the respon-
siveness inquiry detected political market failure in the same manner 
as would be indicated by monopoly pricing schemes. 
In turn, the polarized voting inquiry went one step further in sim-
plifying this assumption. Political market failure could be identified 
not by the distributional outcomes of the legislative process but by the 
electoral practices that selected the representatives. Where electoral 
practices revealed a persistent pattern of racial exclusion, the polarized 
voting inquiry allowed the courts to presume the maldistribution of 
legislative goods that would result. The necessary corollary, however, 
was a presumption of legitimacy in the distribution of legislative goods 
where the courts could identify no adverse effect on minority political 
participation as a result of structural barriers such as at-large elections 
combined with a pattern of polarized voting practices. 
Part of the problem of identifying properly functioning political 
systems, however, extends beyond simple administrability. The nor-
mative outcomes of full political equality have been uncertain since the 
founding strokes of the modem civil rights movement. With Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr., for example, one finds strikingly different chords 
emerging from the demand for the franchise: 
Give us the ballot, and we will no longer have to worry the federal gov-
ernment about our basic rights . . . . Give us the ballot and we will fill 
our legislative halls with men of good will . . . . Give us the ballot and 
we will help bring this nation to a new society based on justice and dedi-
cated to peace. 173 
In one speech, Dr. King equates the franchise with a guarantee of the 
integrity of the political process, a substantive vision of electoral out-
comes in a nondiscriminatory electoral setting, and a normative vision 
of the policy determinations of a polity freed from the blinders of in-
172. Cf. WILLS, supra note 134, at 201-02 (comparing the pluralist ideal of "the free inter-
play of competing interests" with the Madisonian scheme, which "does not so much act against 
monopolies in the name of intellectual free trade as impose a general and prior restraint on 
trade" by insisting that legislators concern themselves only with the public good). 
173. Quoted in Guinier, supra note 28, at 1082 n.14. 
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justice and discrimination.174 Whatever difficulties the ambiguous role 
of the franchise held for the civil rights movement could only be com-
pounded when translated to the substantive law of voting rights. 
To a large extent, the White/Zimmer standards for proof of vote 
dilution reflected the uncertainty over the exact objective of voting 
rights claims. Prior to Gingles, courts were called upon to scrutinize 
process fairness in the physical acts of registering and voting, outcome 
fairness in specific electoral contests, and the ultimate normative fair-
ness of the allocation of societal resources and opportunities through 
the legislative process. As against such a broad-gauged challenge to 
the totality of the political process, the focus on voting patterns and 
electoral outcomes to determine process fairness corresponds to a lim-
ited but real view of the first-order problems in discriminatory electo-
ral systems. The focus on voting patterns offers fairly dependable 
evidence of electoral process failures through the political exclusion of 
minorities while relieving the courts of the need to police the outcomes 
of what can then be certified as fairly constituted political bodies. 
Therein lies both the power and the limitation of voting rights juris-
prudence over the past decade. 
Ill. THE UNFORTUNATE REALITY OF RACIAL DIVISIONS 
The polarized voting analysis assumes two theories of political par-
ticipation to justify judicial intervention against the outcome of 
majoritarian selection. The first theory is process-based, arguing that 
a disproportionate capture of political power by an electoral majority 
is a potentially harmful development in any representative democracy, 
since the normal electoral processes will be helpless in removing an 
entrenched and stable majority from its position of dominance. In the 
specific context of at-large or multimember elections, this theory fur-
ther incorporates empirical evidence that such entrenched majority 
factions will be able to reward themselves with a superordinate share 
of representative positions and may accordingly be immune from the 
give and take of parliamentary horsetrading.175 The result is not just a 
174. The multipurpose quality of the franchise is reflected in the legislative debates accompa-
nying the Voting Rights Act of 1965. A statement by Republican House members in support of 
the Act, for example, speaks repeatedly of the purpose of access to the franchise as restoring the 
responsiveness of political institutions to all citizens, and concludes that "in the political process 
of free and responsive operation of local government lies the final goal of equality in all civil 
rights." H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2437, 2466 (Republican views of William M. McCulloch, Richard H. Poff, William C. Cramer, 
Arch A. Moore, Jr., Clark MacGregor, Carleton J. King, Edward Hutchinson, and Robert 
McClory). 
175. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups/or Political Influ-
ence, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 371, 393 (1983) (arguing that majorities should normally be unable to main-
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maldistribution of elective office, but a distorted allocation of legisla-
tive goods through the political processes. 
The second theory is historically and sociologically specific. When 
the disadvantaged groups under such unchecked majoritarianism are 
historically subordinated groups, most clearly in the case of black 
Americans, the process distortions take on a greater urgency. The cre-
ation of stable patterns of political exclusion through the combination 
of racial voting practices and institutional devices such as at-large elec-
tions has a specific connotation for groups that emerged from formal 
and complete exclusion from the political process only a generation 
ago. These electoral process distortions work a kind of de facto disen-
franchisement, the results of which bear an unfortunate and uncanny 
resemblance to the older regime of formal exclusion of historically dis-
advantaged groups from the political process. 
The view of American electoral practices that emerges from the 
voting rights jurisprudence is that of a pluralism that has failed to 
overcome a paralyzing attachment to racially and ethnically defined 
group identities. Case after case supports the conclusion that the elec-
toral arena remains charged with group-based battles in which the 
simple cuing device of race or ethnicity serves as the mo~ilizing force 
for legions of voters. The integrative hopes of the American melting 
pot fail at the political frontiers of race and ethnicity. This view of 
failed pluralism does not a handsome portrait make. 176 
The pessimistic view of the politics of race that undergirds the new 
voting rights jurisprudence is not without its detractors. The view of 
more-or-less permanent, racially defined factions locked in electoral 
battle over the spoils of the political system runs contrary to a number 
of currently fashionable theories of politics. I will therefore use the 
final section of this article as a defense, in part anticipatory, of the new 
voting rights jurisprudence based upon the twin pillars of process dis-
tortion and substantive exclusion. These foundations of the new vot-
ing rights jurisprudence, grounded in the polarized voting analysis, are 
central in defending this area of law from two very different forms of 
criticism. 
tain complete control over political outcomes if minority factions "are free to bid for votes, form 
majority coalitions, and win the political games"). 
176. As expressed by Richard Epstein, "[a]t its best, the pluralist sees politics as an extension 
of market behavior into the political realm. At its worst, the pluralist recognizes that politics is 
an endless series of pathological special interest deals whose sole validation derives from the 
electoral and the legislative process that generated them." Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republi· 
canism - Or The Flight From Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633, 1637 (1988). Epstein challenges 
republicanism from the right, defending private market-based rights for all but the production of 
public goods, which is the narrow sphere that he delegates to the government. 
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The first body of criticism is aimed at the premise of group-based 
identities in the political sphere. This critique sees the focus on group-
based voting patterns as an unfortunate departure from the coalition-
based, integrative thrust of American politics. Two different argu-
ments are involved here. The right-wing form of the critique sees judi-
cial intervention into the political arena in defense of group rights as a 
departure from the fundamental right of each individual voter to join 
in electoral alignments of choice. The left-wing form considers a juris-
prudence based on hardened community antagonisms at odds with the 
republicanist vision of the transformative role of politics. 
The second set of attacks is grounded in public choice theory. It 
too has two forms, the first of which is a critique of any theory of 
politics that assumes that voter preferences can be accurately gauged 
by the outcomes of elections. The second, more direct criticism is that 
solicitude for minorities in the political process is misdirected because 
it misperceives the disproportionate power minorities can command in 
the political process by virtue of the greater intensity of their prefer-
ences and their superior ability to marshal their supporters. 
A. Racial Identities, the Republican Consensus, 
and Individual Autonomy 
Voting rights jurisprudence runs contrary to communitarian views 
of the political process as an arena for dialogue and integration rather 
than the hardening of historic lines of division. This gives rise to an 
argument, currently presented as the new republicanism, that looks to 
the transformative role of politics in promoting dialogue177 and creat-
ing new preferences.178 Under this view, the capacity to achieve new 
collective grounds for the polity yields political legitimacy.179 
The hallmark of contemporary republicanism, its animating prin-
ciple according to its proponents, is the concept of civic virtue. Civic 
virtue is "the willingness of citizens to subordinate their private inter-
177. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 31-33 (1986). 
178. See Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 3, 10 (1991) (argu-
ing that existing preferences are characterized as "shifting and endogenous," a function of "cur-
rent information, consumption patterns, legal rules, and general social pressures"). 
179. For discussions of the "cognizable common good" to be revealed through the dialogic 
processes, see Michelman, supra note 177, at 40. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in 
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. R.Ev. 29, 31-32 (1985) (arguing that this view animates the 
entire republican view of the structure of constitutional government inherited from the Framers). 
For discussion of the overlap between the concept of a cognizable common good and the Rous-
seauian notion of the "general will," see David M. Estlund, Democracy Without Preference, 99 
PHIL. REV. 397, 416-23 (1990). 
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ests to the general good."180 This in turn requires subordination of 
individual or group self-interest in favor of political engagement to se-
lect "values that ought to control public and private life."181 Through 
the discourse born of public debate, the proponents of republicanism 
contend, politics will yield a social consensus.182 The underlying core 
of republicanism is the aspiration for that politics of consensus.183 
The republicanist image of politics stands quite apart from the 
group-based interests which underlie contemporary voting rights juris-
prudence.184 The polarized voting inquiry searches for distinctly 
group-based identities, as reflected in voting practices, to yield a rudi-
mentary definition of fairness in the political process. The pluralist 
vision of distinct political interests among what Professor Kathleen 
Sullivan terms "involuntary intermediate groups"185 is a source of 
great consternation for the proponents of republicanism. Professor 
Michelman sets out this fundamental conflict of political impulses 
quite clearly: "Republicanism contests with a so-called pluralist vi-
sion, which regards the political system as, ideally, designed to serve 
the self-defined private interests of individuals or groups, fairly repre-
sented in political forums, where they compete under fair rules for fair 
shares of the outputs of public policy."186 The heart of republicanism 
is, therefore, to reject the primacy of any preexisting group identities 
that threaten to derail the collective or communitarian goals of citizen-
ship.187 As summarized by Professor Michelman, 
[R]epublicanism affirms ... the notion of a statewide, substantive com-
mon interest or good. Accordingly, the special mark of republican con-
stitutional thought is affirmation of "an autonomous public interest 
independent of the sum of individual interests," a common interest exis-
tent and determinable not just within the confines of a particular social 
180. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 (2d ed. 1986). 
181. Id. 
182. Michelman, supra note 177, at 23. 
183. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1554 (1988). 
As defined by Professor Sunstein, "the republican view assumes that 'practical reason' can be 
used to settle social issues." Sunstein, supra note 179, at 32. 
184. For those who focus on the distinct historical treatment of blacks in the United States, 
the communitarian faith of the new civic republicans is extremely troubling. See, e.g., Derrick 
Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1611 
(1988) ("[T]he 'shared values' in which the antifederalists laid faith included a historically con· 
stant and (for whites) a unifying belief in the inferior and subordinated position of black Ameri-
cans."); id. at 1614 (noting conceptual obstacles to inclusion in the republican vision of 
community for those persons who " 'could not count themselves heirs to traditions whose mean· 
ings did at those times involve the exclusion or subordination of just those persons' ") (quoting 
Frank I. Michelman, Law'.s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1496 (1988)). 
185. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1716-18 (1988). 
186. Michelman, supra note 177, at 21. 
187. Id. at 27. 
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group .... 188 
Contemporary voting rights jurisprudence has been subjected to at 
least one direct attack from republicanist quarters for its focus on po-
licing group-based rewards in the political process. The critical prob-
lem, according to Professor Kathryn Abrams, is the fixation of voting 
rights law on preexisting divisions to define the entire political process: 
The problem with an aggregation device such as an election is that it 
presents a picture of the winning and losing voters as homogeneous 
masses, without reference to the distinct judgments that formed the basis 
of their votes. It suggests that elections are won by nondescript "majori-
ties" rather than by shifting combinations of smaller groups, who sup-
port a candidate for different reasons, but whose votes combine to 
produce a victory. Because this concept of aggregation obscures the rea-
sons for people's votes, it produces the problems of translation that are 
the final drawback to the preference aggregation modeI.189 
As expressed by the new civic republicans, preference aggregation "di-
rects attention to a single event - the general election - thereby 
neglecting a series of other events that often determine electoral out-
comes and help translate election results into substantive policy."190 
Paradoxically, the challenge to preference aggregation proves to be 
a unifying theme of both the left-wing republicanist critique and a 
right-wing individual autonomy challenge. From the right, the cri-
tique is grounded in a fundamental focus on individual rights in the 
political arena. For this view, the focus on polarized political prefer-
ences threatens to create permanent "ethnic boundaries" that "ulti-
mately smother[ ] democratic choice and threaten[ ] democratic 
institutions."191 As a result, the voting rights jurisprudence is accused 
of "cut[ting] back on the individualistic premises of the reapportion-
ment cases - one person, one vote - and [inching] us along toward a 
corporate concept of electoral democracy."192 
To take an example from Abigail Themstrom, the leading neocon-
servative critic of voting rights law, a genuine problem of political le-
gitimacy stems from persistently racially polarized elections 
in which white voters consistently voted as a bloc against candidates 
(white or black) preferred by blacks. Elections would then amount to a 
188. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: 
Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 445 (1989) (quoting Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and 
Liberalism ziz American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57, 67 (1987)) (foot-
note omitted). 
189. Abrams, supra note 67, at 487 (footnote omitted). 
190. Id. at 488. 
191. Bills to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 
1992, and H.R. 3112 Before theSubcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1310 (1982) (testimony of Professor Donald L. Horowitz). 
192. Id. 
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racial census, with the result that blacks in a majority-white jurisdiction 
would have nothing to lose by remaining home on election day. The 
breakdown of registrants by race would determine the outcome.193 
She immediately contends, however, that "such white solidarity in the 
face of black enfranchisement is seldom permanent; blacks become a 
powerful swing vote when white candidates begin to compete."194 
This critique based on individual autonomy runs strikingly parallel 
to the republicanist criticism of the new voting rights jurisprudence. 
According to Professor Abrams, 
[w]here a minority group is of sufficient size that it cannot be ignored 
without risking electoral outcomes, white voters will be more inclined to 
coalesce with that group. Redrawing district lines to create groups of 
minority voters with such potential influence can help break the cycle of 
mutual avoidance that has characterized polarized politics.195 
As noteworthy as the doctrinal overlap in the critiques from left 
and right is the lack of empirical evidence from the broad trends of 
American voting practices offered to substantiate these claims. 196 It is 
striking that theories purporting to promote more effective minority 
electoral participation proffer no empirical support for the claim that 
white voters will indeed be more likely to coalesce with minority vot-
ers in the absence of judicial intervention. To her credit, Thernstrom 
does make concessions on this score, even if they are not at all inte-
grated into her final thesis: 
There is no doubt that where "racial politics . . . dominates the elec-
toral process" and public office is largely reserved for whites, the method 
of voting should be restructured to promote minority officeholding. Safe 
black or Hispanic single-member districts hold white racism in check, 
limiting its influence. And where whites - and often blacks - regard 
skin color as a qualification for office (in part because no experience sug-
gests otherwise), the election of blacks helps to break both white and 
black patterns of behavior.197 
This leads to the second problem with these critiques. They ap-
pear to hold the peculiar belief that basing a theory of judicial inter-
vention upon the consequences of polarized voting patterns might 
somehow create those patterns rather than vice versa. The critics get 
to this point by disregarding the importance of the empirical findings 
required of a court in a vote dilution case. Under Gingles, an indispen-
193. THERNSTROM, supra note 81, at 23. 
194. Id. 
195. Abrams, supra note 67, at 504. 
196. For a critique ofThernstrom on this score, see Pamela S. Karlan & Peyton McCrary, 
Without Fear and Without Research: Abigail Thernstrom on the Voting Rights Act, 4 J.L. & POL. 
751, 760-61 (1988). 
197. THERNSTROM; supra note 81, at 238-39. 
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sable prerequisite for a plaintiff's judgment is proof that polarized vot-
ing does actually exist as a long-term trend prior to the 
commencement of litigation in any jurisdiction whose electoral system 
is under challenge. If white voters had a propensity to form coalitions 
with black voters in nondistricted election units, then there would be 
no basis for a claim of minority vote dilution. 198 The voting rights 
remedy does not spring into being whenever a minority group can lay 
claim to sufficient numbers to form a majority in a single-member dis-
trict. Rather, the minority group must show that this remedy is neces-
sary to defeat the consequences of a persistent pattern of frustration of 
its determined political choices at the hands of a majority voting 
bloc.199 The Thernstrom/ Abrams critique is misdirected both as a 
matter of positive law - the presumed capacity of blacks and whites 
to form coalitions would defeat a voting rights claim - and on its 
empirical assumptions that such patterns of effective minority partici-
pation are indeed the norm. 
Both the right and left critiques circumvent a more troubling ques-
tion: why shouldn't there be racial voting patterns? Behind the re-
peated empirical observations of racially polarized voting lie 
fundamental differences in the socioeconomic positions of white and 
black Americans. This fact has critical importance, not only in recog-
nizing the fact of racial divergence in the political process but in ex-
plaining the persistence of these differences. 
Let us take but one example, the issue of government expenditures 
on social programs and other regulatory activities. Roughly 30% to 
40% of black Americans live at or below the federal poverty line and 
are dependent on government entitlement programs for some or all of 
their basic needs.200 Some 22.5% of working blacks are employed in 
the public sector, and a stunning 53.5% of all blacks in professional or 
managerial positions are employed by government.201 Cuts in social 
198. In fact, many vote dilution claims have been defeated because of plaintiffs' failure to 
prove cohesive voting patterns. See, e.g., Concerned Citizens v. Hardee County Bd. of Commrs., 
906 F.2d 524 (I Ith Cir. 1990); Monroe v. City of Woodville, 897 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 71 (1990); Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989); Brewer 
v. Ham, 876 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1989); Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 340 (1990); Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1989). 
199. Professor Abrams' next claim compounds the failure to confront the fact of repeated 
court findings of racially polarized voting: "If we concede the polarization hypothesis, we risk 
not only oversimplification, but also reliance on a remedy that is not sufficient, in and of itself, to 
make minorities effective political participants." Abrams, supra note 67, at 504. Contra Guinier, 
supra note 28, at 1127 & n.247 (criticizing Abrams on this score). 
200. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 103, at 231. 
201. Id. at 162. By contrast, 15.3% of working whites are employed by government, and 
only 27.5% of white managerial and professional employees are employed in the public sector. 
Id. 
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service programs have a disproportionate impact on racial and ethnic 
minorities,202 as does any diminution in the level of government em-
ployment. 203 Is it any wonder that blacks and whites have hugely dif-
ferent views on the critical political issue of government responsibility 
to guarantee employment and/or decent standards of living?204 Or 
that polls indicated that blacks and public employees were the only 
groups to oppose the budget-slashing Proposition 13 in California?205 
Having discussed the overlap between the two critiques, let me 
now turn to the divergence between left and right on this score. The 
left critique, primarily through Abrams, is an optimistic exhortation 
that the political process be allowed to play the curative role assigned 
to it in the republican view. Whatever the lack of empirical basis for 
this claim, at least it is directed to the same fact of second-class minor-
ity status in the political process as is the Voting Rights Act and its 
case law. For the right, on the other hand, the communitarian analy-
sis is more of a shill for unchecked majoritarianism. The singular fo-
cus on individual access to the polls, when raised in the face of 
persistent claims of electoral exclusion, amounts to a defense of the 
status quo. Thus Thernstrom angrily frames her central inquiry not 
by recognizing the historically aggrieved position of blacks in the 
American political process but by asking "how much special protec-
tion from white competition are black candidates entitled to?"206 
202. Only two of every 100 white households would be adversely affected by a cut in welfare 
payments, compared to 15 of every 100 black households and 10 of every 100 Hispanic house-
holds. Similarly, food stamps are utilized by nine of every 100 white households, compared to 
26% of black households and 15% of Hispanic households. Id. 
203. See GARY ORFIELD & CAROLE AsHKINAZE, THE CLOSING DOOR: CONSERVATIVE 
POLICY AND BLACK OPPORTUNITY xv, 20-21, 174-204, 231 (1991) (arguing that a reduction in 
the federal commitment to hiring minorities has curbed black employment prospects); Don 
Terry, Cuts in Public Jobs May Hurt Blacks Most, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1991, at Al (reporting 
particular vulnerability of blacks to reductions in public sector employment). 
204. The Edsalls report that a 1984 survey showed a 58 percentage point spread between 
black support for this proposition and white support for it. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 103, 
at 183 (citing WARREN E. MILLER & SANTA A. TRAUGOTI, AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
STUDIES DATA SoURCEBOOK 181 (1989)). As the late Texas congressman Mickey Leland color-
fully observed in 1982, " 'Blacks supporting the Republican Party is like a bunch of chickens 
getting together to support Col. Sanders.' " DAVIDSON, supra note 103, at 235 (quoting Leland). 
205. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 103, at 130. 
206. THERNSTROM, supra note 81, at 5. Thernstrom's argument begins from the unfortunate 
premise of the presumptive legitimacy of the status quo. This view from the top is the subject of 
a great deal of criticism in the critical feminist and critical race literature, where scholars point to 
a pervasive tendency to see whites as the neutral race and males as the neutral gender, making 
nonwhites and females deviants from those "norms.'' See Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Re-
form, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 
HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1379 (1988) ("The white norm •.. continues in an unspoken form as a 
statement of the positive social norm, legitimating the continuing domination of those who do 
not meet it.''); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 15 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 
1310 (1987) ("[T]he phallocentric fallacy ••• consistently leads courts (and even legal reformers) 
to choose the (biological or social) male as the norm and to locate difference in the female.") 
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Polarized voting is not just a result of historic antipathy or en-
forced ethnic divides, nor is it a construct of a misdirected voting 
rights case law seeking to enforce group-based identities and entitle-
ments at the expense of either individual autonomy or broader com-
munitarian values. Rather, much of this unfortunate voting pattern is 
the product of fundamentally different societal interests resulting from 
the basic differences in the socioeconomic means of blacks and whites. 
Under such circumstances, it would be extraordinary if there were not 
divergent voting patterns. The persistence and extremity of the po-
larized voting practices in community after community, despite sub-
stantial numbers of middle-class blacks and poor whites indicates that, 
beyond the divergent socioeconomic interests, there must also be a 
more fundamental racial antipathy at work as wen.201 
The attempt to cast the specter of illegitimate preferences over vot-
ing rights claims fails, at a fundamental level, because remedying the 
racial impact of voting systems is not subject to the same criticisms as 
affirmative action programs in employment, for example. Voting is 
not an area in which preexisting individual white expectations have 
been formed. Even Thernstrom acknowledges that there is no coun-
tervailing entitlement claim that whites could raise in opposition to 
minority claims for enhanced electoral opportunity: "Whites denied 
medical school admission as a consequence of minority preference 
(footnote omitted); Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 39-43 (1987) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court's pregnancy discrimination decisions, by allowing employers to 
ignore the difference of pregnancy, have perpetuated the assumption that equal treatment is mea-
sured by a male norm); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 
YALE L.J. 1373, 1378 (1986) (Males are the "picture of humanity,'' while. "women are but male 
subjectivity glorified, objectified, elevated to the status of reality."); Patricia J. Williams, Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REv. 525, 530 (1990) 
(whites are treated as the "neutral" race, while blacks are the "other"). 
Critical observers have similarly spoken of policymakers' general inability to put themselves 
in the position of the "other." See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) (observing, while discussing whether the Establishment Clause prohibits a munici-
pality from displaying a nativity creche at Christmas, that "[i]fthe audience is large, as it always 
is when government 'speaks' by word or deed, some portion of the audience will inevitably re-
ceive a message determined by the 'objective' content of the statement, and some portion will 
inevitably receive the intended message"); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that 
pervasive, unconscious racism requires that allegedly discriminatory governmental acts be evalu-
ated in terms of their cultural meanings rather than the government actors' intentions); Mari J. 
Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 323 (1987) (arguing that the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement has suffered from CLS 
scholars' failure to integrate the experiences of minorities into their work); Minow, supra, at 51 
(Supreme Court Justices tend to "reject[] as irrelevant or relatively unimportant the experience 
of 'different' people and have denied their own partiality, often by using stereotypes as though 
they were real.") (footnotes omitted). 
207. For a view of voting rights developments focusing on the extent of persistent racial 
antagonisms, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Signifi-
cance of Racism, 63 U. Cow. L. REV. 325, 355-64 (1992). 
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have been arguably denied a right; those disadvantaged by a change in 
the electoral rules cannot make that claim."203 Remedies flowing 
from voting rights claims must be judged against process-based ac-
counts of republican government and a substantive evaluation of 
which groups suffer the brunt of electoral exclusion. Unlike employ-
ment claims, for example, voting rights challenges do not implicate 
preexisting expectations of the continued spoils born of majority over-
representation to which independent, legally vested interests have 
attached.209 
Moreover, to the extent that one aspires to break down racially 
defined political allegiances, it is quite possible that facilitating minor-
ity representation may promote that end, even if the means chosen 
reward minority bloc voting. The election of minorities in the face of 
white bloc voting does not necessarily translate into complete exclu-
sion at the legislative level. This view "fails to recognize that voting 
and coalition-building among representatives differ significantly from 
voting and coalition-building among the citizenry as a whole."210 
There are at least three potential reasons for this: first, representative 
bodies are collegial groups whose members need to work with each 
other on a daily basis; second, repeat voting is more likely to give rise 
to coalition building than the limited participation of the citizenry at 
large would allow; and, third, legislative voting occurs in an institu-
tional setting that formalizes debate and deliberation.211 While the 
history of minority participation on elected bodies has not necessarily 
fulfilled the promises of such participation,212 allowing for elected rep-
resentation under racially polarized voting conditions may well facili-
tate the breaking down of some racial and ethnic barriers. 
208. THERNSTROM, supra note 81, at 242. 
209. See Samuel Issacharolf, When Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the 
Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 204-18 
(1992) (analyzing Supreme Court employment discrimination doctrines from vantage point of 
burden placed upon dispreferred groups or individuals). 
210. Karlan, supra note 47, at 216. 
211. Id. at 216-18; WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF PoLmCAL COALITIONS 51 (1962) 
(coalition formation more likely among small groups than broad diffuse masses). 
212. A particularly disturbing example is the election of the first Mexican-American member 
to a small rural school district in Texas. Immediately upon her election, the board changed its 
internal procedures to require a second before any item could be placed on the voting agenda, a 
requirement that had not been in effect while the board was entirely Anglo. See Rojas v. Victorin 
Indep. Sch. Dist., Civ. A. No. V-87-16, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11049 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 1988), 
ajfd., 490 U.S. 1001 (1989); see also supra note 29 (discussing similar alteration of decisionmnk-
ing rules to frustrate first-time minority elected officials in Presley v. Etowah County Commn., 
112 S. Ct. 820 (1992)). 
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B. Preference and Prejudice 
Contemporary voting rights doctrine, relying as it does on the find-
ing of racially polarized voting, makes two key assumptions. The first 
is that there are indeed discernible, racially defined voting patterns, 
and the second is that such voting patterns place the minority at a 
disadvantage in the electoral marketplace. Each of these assumptions 
is subject to criticism from social choice or public choice scholars. 
The first critique, which I shall consider the soft form of social choice 
theory, concerns the ability to discern meaningful social preferences 
through the examination of voting patterns. This critique does not 
refer to the methodological steps taken actually to measure the extent 
to which blacks and whites vote as blocs,213 but rather to whether 
there are actually meaningful preferences established through the vot-
ing processes that can justify judicial intervention. The second form of 
the social choice critique, the harder form, is whether the propensity 
for group-based bloc voting is a disadvantage or an advantage in the 
political process. 
1. The Arrow Impossibility Theorem 
The first critique begins with the famous Impossibility Theorem 
developed by Kenneth Arrow.214 The Arrow Theorem expresses 
grave skepticism about whether the product of any decisionmaking 
process can be thought to represent a true ordering of preferences un-
tainted by the constraints of the selection process. Within each rank-
ing of preferences is the "cycling" problem of divergent preferences' 
being forged into a majority vote by the constraints of the selection 
process, or of other equally unacceptable constraints upon democratic 
choice.215 Following Arrow, it is difficult to see any electoral outcome 
as reflecting the preferences of the majority or to see the majority pref-
213. See supra note 98 for a discussion of the methodological disputes surrounding the actual 
measurement of voting patterns. See also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 52-54 (1986) {dis-
cussing the use of bivariate ecological regression and homogeneous precinct analysis to establish 
polarized voting patterns). 
214. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). 
215. The key insight is derived from an application of the "voter's paradox," initially devel-
oped by the French political theorist Condorcet in tlie eighteenth century. See Richard H. Pi!des 
& Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, 
and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2129-35 (1990) (setting forth Condorcet's 
voter's paradox and the Arrow Impossibility Theorem). Condorcet demonstrated that for any 
set of voting choices, alternative outcomes would emerge depending on how the choices were 
presented to the voters. Arrow generalized this finding to be a fundamental problem of all collec-
tive decisionmaking: "In theoretically searching for democratic procedures that would aggregate 
the given preferences of individuals into a single collective outcome, Arrow discovered that the 
paradox turns out to be an inescapable feature of any decision-making process likely to be consid-
ered even minimally fair." Id. at 2131. 
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erences as legitimating the ensuing policy outcomes. Not only may 
the manner of choice presentation to the voters influence the outcome, 
but preferences may be unstable over time and distorted by the frozen 
snapshot of the electoral process. One of the implications of Arrow is 
the difficulty of even discerning majority preferences, let alone con-
structing a democratic theory based on the presumed inviolability of 
such preferences as revealed through elections. As summarized by 
Professor Sunstein: 
[A]ccurate preference-aggregation through politics is unlikely to be ac-
complished in the light of the conundrums in developing a social welfare 
function. Public choice theory has shown that cycling problems, strate-
gic and manipulative behavior, sheer chance and other factors make ma-
joritarianism highly unlikely to provide an accurate aggregation of 
preferences. 216 
In part, the insights derived from the Arrow Impossibility Theo-
rem should lend credence to the demands of minorities that electoral 
systems that frustrate their political aspirations be denied the pre-
sumptive legitimacy accorded to majoritarian outcomes. However, a 
key part of Arrow translates into skepticism about whether any true 
majority preference may exist. The impact of voting procedures on 
substantive outcomes, together with the problem of cycling of voter 
choices, yields an inability to interpret any electoral outcome "as 
uniquely representing the popular will. "217 This argument could be ap-
plied both to the outcomes of individual elections and to the view that 
elected legislatures cannot be presumed to "reflect the views of a ma-
jority in society."218 Because of the difficulty of aggregating genuine 
preferences, the Arrow Impossibility Theorem is thought to demon-
strate "that the notion of a popular will is incoherent, or that the popu-
lar will is itself incoherent, whichever you prefer."219 
216. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutions and Democracies: An Epilogue, in CoNSTITUTIONALISM 
AND DEMOCRACY 327, 335 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (citations omitted). 
217. JULES L. CoLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 298 (1988). 
218. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term -Foreword: The Vanishing Con-
stitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 79 (1989); see also Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A 
Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 
1567, 1616 (1988). For application of the Arrow Impossibility Theorem to legislative decision-
making, see Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality. 63 TEXAS L. 
REV. 207, 226-27 (1984) (difficulty of courts' deciphering legislative intent); Frank H. Easter-
brook, Statutes' Domains, SOU. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547-48 (1983) (applying public choice theory 
to posit the impossibility of discerning legislative intent). See also WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & 
PHILLIPP. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREA-
TION OF PUBLIC POLICY 597-613 (1988) (summarizing the public choice scholarship on statutory 
interpretation). This view of statutory interpretation has also come to dominate the jurispru-
dence of Justice Antonin Scalia. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIPP. FRICKEY, LAW AND 
PUBLIC CHOICE 89 n.3 (1991) (compiling opinions by Justice Scalia that address the issue of 
statutory interpretation). 
219. JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 155 (1989) (emphasis ad-
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I am not aware of any direct application of the insights of the Ar-
row Theorem to voting rights law. Nonetheless, there is a stark dis-
juncture between a legal doctrine founded on the electoral preferences 
of racial and ethnic communities and an analytic school which dis-
putes the ability to draw any conclusions about aggregate preferences 
from electoral results. To a limited extent, the Arrow Theorem might 
appear to justify a more rigorous examination of the causal connection 
between race or ethnicity and voting patterns. As played out in voting 
rights litigation, this has turned into a methodological dispute between 
the use of bivariate regression analyses to establish simple correlations 
between the racial composition of communities and the resulting elec-
toral behavior and the use of more sophisticated multivariate models 
to try to isolate the role of race or ethnicity in causing the polarized 
voting outcomes.220 
Nothing in the voting rights literature defending the evidentiary 
methodologies currently in use can match the sophistication of the Ar-
row cycling problem. Two defenses of the voting rights case law are 
available, however, even in the face of the inability to define a perfectly 
coherent majority preference. The first is to take the polarized voting 
analysis as empirical evidence of the persistence of electoral defeats of 
candidates who would have been elected to office had the election been 
confined to a minority-dominated electoral subdistrict rather than an 
at-large jurisdiction. This finding pervades the case law and social sci-
ence literature and persists across time and geographic jurisdiction. 
Even if we are not willing to assign a fixed affirmative preference to the 
voting majorities in these jurisdictions, we can identify a negative pref-
erence based on the actions taken: that, as innumerable studies have 
shown, across time and region, irrespective of their individual motiva-
tions, white voters are unwilling to vote for minority candidates.221 
ded). See generally WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM (1982) (applying im-
possibility theorem to political decisionmaking); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and 
the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. R.Ev. 123, 126-27 (1989) ("The most basic 
finding of the Arrovian branch of public choice theory might be characterized as indicating that 
collective action must be either objectionable or uninterpretable."); Pildes & Anderson, supra 
note 215, at 2124-28 (providing the best overview of the application of the Arrow Theorem to 
political decisionmaking and constitutional Jaw). 
220. The statutory language of amended § 2 of the Act opts for the first, "results"-based 
outcome. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988). The strongest argument for the use of a complex, mul-
tivariate analysis was put forward by Judge Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit in Jones v. City of 
Lubbock, 730 F.2d 233, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring). That 
standard of proof was rejected by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 61-
63 (1986). 
221. See Guinier, supra note 28, at 1112 (concluding that "[a]s a general rule whites do not 
vote for blacks"); id. at 1113 nn.167-68 (accumulating survey and social science evidence of 
white antipathy toward black candidates). This corresponds to what Justice Rehnquist called "a 
sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the 
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Moreover, because of the persistence of this pattern, we may be willing 
to assume that the observed patterns are the result of something more 
than a question of cycling - that is, of the manner in which the 
choices are put to the voters - and may indeed reflect genuine racial 
antipathy. 
The more fundamental defense of voting rights law, however, turns 
not on the interpretation of aggregate preferences but on the resulting 
distribution of legislative opportunity. Recall that the polarized vot-
ing inquiry emerged in large part as an evidentiary proxy for the cum-
bersome examination of the responsiveness of governmental 
institutions to the needs of all citizens. Nonresponsiveness was never 
intended to be a measure of a legislative refusal or inability to meet the 
distributional preferences of the majority of voters. Instead, 
nonresponsiveness was defined as the failure to allocate goods and 
services fairly among all the constituents of the community.222 
Ultimately, this body oflaw is not so concerned with whether elec-
toral outcomes fully represent the actual preferences of voters. The 
capture of legislative opportunity by a racially defined majority faction 
is as objectionable if an all-white city council is the real and verifiable 
preference of a majority of voters or if the selection process has suf-
fered distortion under some second best theory. The result is the 
same: an all-white city council will be called upon to decide the distri-
bution of legislative goods for that community. At bottom, voting 
rights law posits access to representative office as a social good that an 
entrenched and racially defined majority community cannot monopo-
lize, regardless of the fidelity of the electoral outcome to the true pref-
erences of a majority of voters. 
2. Are the Discrete and Insular Disadvantaged? 
The more troubling application of public choice theory to political 
life is not the indeterminacy of the Arrow cycling problem but the 
critical question of discrimination." Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). 
Given the particular history of race in shaping the modern political agenda, it seems wise to join 
Justice Rehnquist's conclusion from the employment discrimination setting that "we know from 
our experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner ...• " 
438 U.S. at 577. 
222. See, e.g., Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 882·84 (5th Cir. 1979) (comparing provision of 
governmental services and distribution of government jobs to overall black and white comm uni· 
ties to satisfy responsiveness inquiry); see also Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980): 
Showings of unresponsiveness and lack of access make a strong dilution case. The capacity 
of a governing body to respond to the needs of its constituency is, in large measure, what 
makes that body representative. Ideally, electoral processes are designed to provide an insti· 
tutional and periodic method of guaranteeing governmental responsiveness. 
571 F.2d at 223 n.19 (citation omitted). 
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fundamental corruption introduced by the influence of "special inter-
est groups" in the electorate. In its academic form, what I will term 
the hard form of social choice theory draws its inspiration from the 
work of Nobel laureate James Buchanan.223 This theory holds the leg-
islative arena to be the site of rent-seeking behavior by specially organ-
ized subgroups of the population. Under this view, both the selection 
of legislators and the outcomes of the legislative process are corrupted 
by the ability of those setting the voting agenda to control the outcome 
of the electoral and political processes. 224 
The next step in this argument is to examine which groups are 
likely to be able to benefit through the capture of the political process. 
These observers conclude that because of free-rider problems, transac-
tion costs, and other obstacles to acquiring information about the 
political process, small, well-defined groups with high-intensity prefer-
ences will dominate the legislative scene. 225 These groups may be able 
to secure rent-seeking legislation that, for example, may limit competi-
tive entry into a regulated market or directly subsidize some group at 
the public's expense.226 A simple example may illustrate the problem. 
Surveys routinely show that a majority of Americans favors some 
form of gun control.227 Nonetheless, that broad majority is unable to 
223. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 
(1962). 
224. See, e.g., William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legisla-
tive Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REv. 373, 
396 (1988) (characterizing the legislator as "a placeholder opportunistically building up an ad 
hoc majority for the next election"); id. at 393 (arguing that because of cycling problems, the 
"absence of an equilibrium implies that the person in control of the agenda (e.g., a committee 
leader) can bias legislative choice in favor of his or her most preferred alternative. Thus, there is 
a fundamental arbitrariness to social choice under majority rule.") (footnotes omitted). 
225. Although this area of social choice theory is still quite young, an extensive literature on 
the subject has been well summarized in Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. 
REV. 167 (1988). For overviews of this theory of the legislative process, see Becker, supra note 
175, at 380 (1983) (focusing on the ability to discipline potential free riders as the key to political 
effectiveness); Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public 
Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471 (1988). 
226. See ROBERT E. McCoRMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, PoLmCIANS, LEGISLATION, 
AND THE EcONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 49 
(1981) (describing benefits to members of regulated professions by limitations of entry into those 
professions, and noting that "such legislation typically results from lobbying pressure by practi-
tioners in the occupation"); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Foreword: 
The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17 (1984) (providing examples of 
rent-seeking behavior); Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest 
State.· The Story of Butter and Margarine, 71 CAL. L. REv. 83 (1989) (describing dairy industry 
capture of regulatory power to prohibit yellow coloration of margarine in name of consumer 
protection). 
227. See, e.g., Frances Ann Bums, Poll: New Jersey Residents Favor Tougher Gun Control, 
UPI, July 6, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (stating that 58% of New Jersey 
residents "strongly support" ban on assault weapons); Helen Dewar, NRA Begins Drive to Stall 
Crime Bill, WASH. POST, July 10, 1991, at A13 (discussing political use of Senate filibuster to 
frustrate popularly supported gun control). 
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organize itself and is unable to deliver votes on the basis of intensity of 
preference on the issue of gun control alone. Politicians may vote 
against gun control yet secure the support of gun-control backers on 
other issues. By contrast, opponents of gun control, organized in a 
well-disciplined group through the National Rife Association, will be 
informed of the position of any candidate on the gun control question 
and will vote against pro-gun control candidates on that issue alone. 
As a result, candidates can be assured of few guaranteed votes based 
on a pro-gun control plank but will assuredly lose a significant number 
of votes because of such a position. Thus, despite majority sentiment 
in favor of regulation, the smaller, well-organized gun lobby is able to 
exert disproportionate influence in the political process and thwart at-
tempts at regulation. 
Under the public choice rationale, the well-defined minority 
groups in society are not at a competitive disadvantage in politics. 
Rather, the broad, diffuse majorities who are unable to discipline their 
followers into collective action are most at risk. Thus, we now hear 
Professor Bruce Ackerman proclaim: 
Carolene is utterly wrongheaded in its diagnosis. Other things being 
equal, "discreteness and insularity" will normally be a source of enor-
mous bargaining advantage, not disadvantage, for a group engaged in 
pluralist American politics. Except for special cases, the concerns that 
underlie Carolene should lead judges to protect groups that possess the 
opposite characteristics from the ones Carolene emphasizes - groups 
that are "anonymous and diffuse" rather than "discrete and insular." It 
is these groups that both political science and American history indicate 
are systematically disadvantaged in a pluralist democracy.228 
Public choice scholarship would suggest that the presumption of 
minority disadvantage that underlies voting rights law is at best ques-
tionable229 and that the special solicitude of the voting rights case law 
for minorities in the political process is not justified. The voting rights 
case law rests on the empirical observation that polarized voting prac-
tices essentially leave racial and ethnic minorities as discrete and insu-
lar groups in the political process and that their discrete and insular 
status is a political disadvantage. But the Buchanan view posits that 
the discrete identity of minorities may give them, like the National 
Rifle Association, disproportionate strength rather than weakness in 
the political process. Cohesive minority actors in the political market-
place should enjoy advantages stemming from their intense, shared 
preferences and their ability to deliver more concentrated benefits to 
228. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-24 (1985). 
229. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 218, at 29-37 (reviewing scholarly literature). 
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their constituents. 230 
This is by no means a trivial issue. Minorities have scored impres-
sive political gains on the national stage, just as public choice would 
have predicted.231 But, before rushing to discard protection for dis-
crete and insular groups in the political process, we should explore 
some mediating concerns. The public choice scholarship has been sub-
ject to extensive criticism for its reliance on economic self-interest as 
the exclusive causal agent in politics and for its failure to acknowledge 
the role of ideology in the political process. 232 Repeated social science 
studies have shown simple ideological alignments, such as liberal or 
conservative, to be highly predictive of legislator behavior and, by im-
plication, to account for a significant portion of voter behavior.233 
Moreover, the public choice scholarship does not establish the im-
possibility of organizing broad and diffuse majorities, but merely the 
difficulty of doing so. In this sense, Ackerman generalizes beyond 
what public choice can support. While the organization of broad ma-
jority groups is difficult for precisely the reasons that public choice 
theory tells us - preferences may be diffuse, making it decidedly diffi-
cult to overcome free-rider problems and to marshal support - that 
does not mean it is impossible. Ackerman himself allows for one pos-
sible exception to the benefits that well-defined minorities are assumed 
to enjoy in the political process: the question of prejudice.234 
Although Ackerman disputes whether there is any longer a "pariah" 
effect for minorities in the political process, the evidence of polarized 
voting shows that majority refusal to incorporate racial minorities per-
sists, particularly at the local level. 235 Racial lines of division play the 
230. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Re-
view?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 49 (1991) (identifying features of special interest groups that give them 
advantages in political process, but arguing that absent a normative baseline there is no basis for 
claiming this distorts political process). 
231. Even during the Reagan/Bush years, for example, when minority interests have gener-
ally been thought to be at their recent political nadir, the legislative record is by no means 
unidimensional. For example, minorities have had notable success in overturning adverse 
Supreme Court decisions through legislation, as with the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments, 
Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 {codified at 42 U.S.C. §·1973 (1988)) (overturning City of 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)), the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 
100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1988)) (overturning Grove City 
College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)), and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 
(overturning in whole or in part eight adverse Supreme Court employment discrimination 
decisions). 
232. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 218, at 23-24. 
233. See id. at 27-33 (reviewing social science evidence). 
234. Ackerman, supra note 228, at 732-37. 
235. This fact prompted Justice Scalia to comment, 
What the record shows •.. is that racial discrimination against any group finds a more ready 
expression at the state and local than at the federal level. To the children of the Founding 
Fathers, this should come as no surprise. An acute awareness of the heightened danger of 
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same role in organizing broad majority voting practices as ideology 
does in ordering political behavior. As Professors Farber and Frickey 
rightfully note, "Ackerman explicitly addresses himself to the future 
when full minority political participation is commonplace and our 
'grim history' has been overcome. If Ackerman errs, it is in underesti-
mating the tenacious hold of that history."236 
The true insight of public choice theory concerns the advantage a 
well-organized, discrete, and insular minority will hold when faced 
with opposition of less intensity by a diffuse and amorphous majority. 
Being discrete and insular is an advantage only if the majority is unor-
ganized; so long as the majority retains its diffuse and amorphous 
character, a well-disciplined minority should hold a relative advantage 
in the political arena. 237 Here again, the polarized voting inquiry is 
key. Unlike the situation of blacks, members of the National Rifle 
Association are not subject to consistent polarized voting by the amor-
phous majority that prefers some form of gun control. The NRA 
holds a relative edge. Black voters, on the other hand, face a majority 
voting bloc that is not diffuse. The polarized voting evidence demon-
strates that racial divides continue to dominate the electoral arena. 
Public choice theory offers genuine insights about the difficulty, 
although not the impossibility, of sustaining broad group action in the 
political arena. To overcome the collective action problems associated 
with any group effort, simple cues must direct conduct along well-
established paths.238 In group decisionmaking, such as voting, the 
"consequences are aggregate but the decisions are exceedingly individ-
oppression from political factions in small, rather than large, political units dates to the very 
beginning of our national history. 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 523 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also 
Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights As a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1148 (1991)(attribut-
ing Madison's concern over majority oppression at local level to, e.g., the fact that "state legisla-
tive representation was so much less attenuated than congressional representation, making state 
legislative majorities far more likely to reflect the unrefined sentiments of popular majorities"), 
236. Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Af-
firmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 19 CAL. L. REV. 685, 708 (1991) 
(footnote omitted). 
237. See Calabresi, supra note 159, at 96 (suggesting that solicitude for discrete and insular 
minorities should be limited to "those who have a long record of social marginalization and 
relative powerlessness in the legislative process"). 
238. For example, the primary determinant of voter behavior in American politics tradition-
ally has been party preference. See Philip L. Dubois, Voting Cues in Nonpartisan Trial Court 
Elections: A Multivariate Assessment, 18 LAW & SocY. REV. 395, 397 (1984) (voter participation 
is greater in partisan than in nonpartisan judicial races because "the party label [provides] voters 
with a familiar voting cue, one which touches upon the psychological identification most voters to 
some degree have with one of the major parties. When the party label is not present, a larger 
portion of voters find themselves with no meaningful guide to voting and thus fail to partici-
pate.") (quoting Philip L. Dubois, Public Participation in Trial Court Elections, 2 LAW & POLY. 
Q. 133, 135 (1980)). When party information is unavailable, voters substitute other cues such as 
incumbency, name familiarity, religious-ethnic cues apparent from candidate surnames, sex, oc-
June 1992] Polarized Voting 1889 
ual."239 For masses of white voters to consistently reject minority can-
didates in successive elections and jurisdictions, a simple and direct 
behavioral cue must be at work. 240 
Given the centrality of the racial divide in American history, from 
slavery forward, the race card is the perfect mechanism to overcome 
the collective action problem in moving broad masses to act in a disci-
plined fashion. Race is the perfect cue: it is a simple cal1241 and it 
elicits intensely held beliefs and values. 242 Race serves more than per-
haps any other single issue in contemporary American life as a defin-
ing ideological bellwether.243 
cupation, geography, or even relative position on the ballot. Philip L. Dubois, Significance of 
Voting Cues in State Supreme-Court Elections, 13 LAW & SocY. REV. 757 (1979). 
239. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 145 (1978). 
240. For a discussion of the collective action problems in organizing mass behavior, see DEN-
NIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 103-40 (1991) (discuss-
ing the assurance game aspect of organizing collective action around civil rights issues). 
241. The voting rights case law has understood this point relatively well, as reflected in the 
inquiry into the use of racial appeals in election campaigns as Factor 6 of the enumerated Senate 
Report factors accompanying the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. See S. REP. No. 
417, supra note 67, at 28-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206-07. This is perhaps most 
striking in electoral campaigns in which white candidates publish pictures of themselves next to 
their black opponents in their own campaign literature. See, e.g., McDaniels v. Mehfoud, 702 F. 
Supp. 588, 595 (E.D. Va. 1988). See generally Williams v. City of Dallas, 734 F. Supp. 1317, 
1360 n.119 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (quoting Bernard Grofman et al., The "Totality of Circumstances 
Test" in Section 2 of the 1982 Extension of the Voting Rights Act: A Social Science Perspective, 7 
LAW & POLY. 199, 214 (1985)); Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. CIV.A 
89-239 LON., 1991 WL 274840, at *18 (D. Del. Dec. 27, 1991); Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. 
Supp. 345, 364 (E.D.N.C. 1984), affd. in part and revd. in part sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 
478 U.S. 30 (1986); see also GEORGE E. SIMPSON & J. MILTON YINGER, RACIAL AND CUL-
TURAL MINORmES: AN ANALYSIS OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 105-11 (4th ed. 1972) 
(arguing that racial difference provides a convenient, permanent reference point for the ethnocen-
trism, common to all societies, that provides a rationale and an impetus for maintaining the in-
group's privileges). 
242. I will not attempt to reproduce the vast literature dealing with the centrality of race and 
racial identities in the everyday life of America. I commend to the reader, among other sources, 
Aleinikoff, supra note 207; Lawrence, supra note 206. 
243. 
That voters will support the candidate with whom they share skin color is hardly sur-
prising. In addition to racists, some voters will tum to race as a cue if they find the competi-
tors' policy stands equally attractive .••. 
The race of the candidate should be more powerful than other personal characteristics 
since it is more closely associated with a number of policy options than are club member-
ships or university affiliations. A voter would usually be correct in assuming that a black 
candidate is more liberal than an opposing white. Moreover, race - but not religion or 
alma mater - is readily discernible by a glance at a campaign poster, brochure, or television 
ad. Voting for a candidate of one's own race may be a product of racism, or it may be the 
result of reliance on a simple, readily available cue, much as a candidate's last name prompts 
some ethnically oriented voters to forsake party identification and support a fellow ethnic. 
Charles S. Bullock Ill, Racial Crossover Voting and the Election of Black Officials, 46 J. POL. 
238, 239-40 (1984) (citations omitted). Even where partisan attachments are relatively strong, 
race may be an even stronger determinant of voting behavior. James M. Vanderleeuw, A City in 
Transition: The Impact of Changing Racial Composition on Voting Behavior, 71 Soc. Sci. Q. 326, 
326 (1990); see also ANGUS CAMPBELL, WHITE ATIITUDES TOWARD BLACK PEOPLE 158 
(1971) ("[l]n the absence of inhibitions associated with religious or educational experience griev-
ances against the community are displaced into hostility against black people."); MILTON D. 
1890 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1833 
Polarized voting analysis is the evidence that race is playing just 
such a role. Although the causal link between racial divides and diver-
gent voting patterns has not been established scientifically, two hy-
potheses suggest why that link exists. First, race is increasingly 
recognized as a central feature of the most obvious political division in 
American life: Democrats versus Republicans. In the period since the 
passage of the Voting Rights Act, race has increasingly emerged "from 
a regional concern into a national issue, from partisan obscurity to a 
fundamental division between the parties, from being unconnected to 
mass political beliefs to being at the core of mass ideology."244 Sec-
ond, the socioeconomic status of minorities is centrally implicated in 
so many controversial domestic policy issues - including schools, 
transfer payments, housing policy, mass transit, the use of tax policy 
to underwrite social welfare programs, indeed, virtually all but abor-
tion245 - as to give a predictable racial axis to the policy debates sur-
rounding these issues. 
Because of the centrality of the racial dimensions to the dominant 
debates of contemporary political life, the race card can be played with 
minimal organization and maximum effectiveness. The prevalence of 
racially polarized voting patterns indicates that racial factionalism is 
alive and well, and that even majority factions are able to discipline 
their troops effectively. So long as this remains the case, discreteness 
and insularity will continue to serve as sources of political vulnerabil-
ity fully meriting special legal solicitude. 
CONCLUSION 
Modern voting rights law rests on the foundations of a failed plu-
ralism in the political process and the distortions of public policy that 
follow from that failure. During the past two decades, the concept of 
MORRIS, THE PoLmcs OF BLACK AMERICA 121 (1975) ("[R]ace forms the basis of one funda-
mental cleavage in the society which is reflected in virtually every area of political life."); H. 
Andrew Sagar & Janet W. Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and White Children's 
Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 590 (1980) 
(black actors performing ambiguously aggressive acts elicit more threatened responses in chil· 
dren than white actors performing the same acts); Tommy E. Whittler & Joan DiMeo, Viewers' 
Reactions to Racial Cues in Advertising Stimuli, 31 J. ADVERTISING RES. 37, 43 (1991) 
("[R]egardless of their attitudes toward blacks, whites were less likely to purchase the products 
and had less favorable attitudes toward the products ... when the advertisements featured black 
rather than white actors."). 
244. EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PoLmCS 185 (1989); see also DAVIDSON, supra note 103, at 
240-59; EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 103, at 137-53. 
245. While restrictions on access to abortion may have greater effects on the poor, who are 
disproportionately minority, the abortion debate draws centrally on deeply held values independ· 
ent of racial or ethnic considerations. 
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minority vote dilution has emerged from a multifaceted inquiry into 
every component of the political and economic workings of a jurisdic-
tion into a shorthand calculus for process failure and substantive ex-
clusion. That shorthand is the inquiry into the exclusion of minority-
preferred candidates from office in the course of racially polarized 
elections. 
The racially polarized voting inquiry has greatly facilitated the 
curtailment of at-large and multimember election practices and the 
dramatic increase in numbers of minority elected officials. The new 
focus on actual voting practices for the first time has lent a coherence 
to court intervention in local electoral practices and defined workable 
boundaries for judicial review of election outcomes. To the extent that 
the modem doctrines have been successful at these tasks, this article is 
designed to provide a conceptual defense for this area of law. 
Whether the new voting rights law has failed at the broader trans-
formative goals of the civil rights movement is an inquiry beyond the 
scope of this article. It is difficult to argue with critics who would 
focus on the increasingly desperate plight of the black underclass in 
urban areas that have been increasingly committed to black local gov-
ernance. Neither the distressed socioeconomic standing of the under-
class nor the political advances of those blacks elected to office can be 
denied. 
Yet there can be no doubt that the new voting rights law has 
changed and invigorated minority participation in American politics. 
Nor can there be any doubt that it has done so at some cost to pluralist 
aspirations for a race-neutral politics by exposing the continued disa-
bilities attaching to race in the political arena. On balance, this is, I 
maintain, a limited but real step forward. It is, in Madison's words, "a 
republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican 
government. "246 
246. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 132, No. 10 (Madison), at 23. 
